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CRIMINAL LAW-UNITED STATES V. CANINO AND THE CONTINU­
ING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE: Do DRUG KINGPINS HAVE A RIGHT 
TO SPECIFIC JUROR AGREEMENT? 
INTRODUCTION 
One might assume that in federal criminal trials, a convicting jury 
must agree on the crime or crimes that the defendant committed. As 
one court put it, "[u]nanimity is an indispensable element of a federal 
jury triaL"! Absolute unanimity is not guaranteed, however, espe­
cially when the case involves a complex statutory crime. Take, for 
example, a case in which the criminal defendant, "DO," is accused of 
committing the crime of "A." Commission of that crime involves es­
sentially two acts, "B" and "C." Moreover, committing "c" requires 
the commission of three predicate acts. Six of the jurors find DO 
guilty of three particular acts, which satisfy part "c" of the crime, 
while the other six find "DO" guilty of three entirely different acts 
which satisfy "C." All twelve agree that "DO" is guilty of crime "A." 
May the jury return a guilty verdict and convict "DO?" 
The Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute ("CCE")2 describes a 
complex crime much like the crime of "A" in the aforementioned hy­
pothetical. In United States v. Canino,3 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the validity of the defendant's 
conviction under the CCE without requiring specific juror unanimity 
on the statute's "continuing series" element.4 The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, in United States v. 
Echeverri,s required specific unanimity with respect to the "continuing 
1. United States v. Scalzitti, 578 F.2d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 1978); see also infra notes 55­
56 and accompanying text. 
2. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988). The Continuing Criminal Enterprise provision was en­
acted as part of title III of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1265 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848 
(1988». 
3. 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1940 (1992). 
4. Id. at 947. 
5. 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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series" element.6 This Note will consider these two conflicting deci­
sions and how the jury unanimity requirement interacts with the CCE. 
Section I addresses the components of the CCE, its purpose, the 
circumstances surrounding its enactment, and the requirement of jury 
unanimity in federal criminal trials. Section II discusses the conflict­
ing cases on the issue of jury unanimity with respect to the "continu­
ing series" element of the CCE. It reviews the facts and reasoning of 
the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Canino,1 as well as 
the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Echeverri. 8 Section III 
analyzes the present state of the law on the issue of juror divergence 
with regard to the underlying factual elements of a charged offense. It 
examines the due process implications of juror disagreement and dis­
cusses the recent Supreme Court decision, Schad v. Arizona,9 which 
considered factual divergence among jurors in terms of a state's first 
degree murder statute. Section III also compares the CCE to the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")lO and 
discusses the treatment of jury unanimity in RICO cases. Finally, this 
Note concludes that the jury should be required to agree, by a substan­
tial majority, on the underlying predicate acts that establish a "contin­
uing series of violations" under the CCE and that the use of special 
verdicts would serve to assure such agreement. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute 
The CCE was originally drafted as part of the Drug Abuse Pre­
vention and Control Act of 1970 (the "Act").ll Congress enacted the 
Act which amended the Public Health Services Act and similar laws. 12 
The purpose of the Act was threefold: (1) to provide authority to in­
crease drug abuse prevention and user rehabilitation efforts, (2) to sup­
ply more effective law enforcement means to carry out drug abuse 
prevention and control measures, and (3) to establish an overall plan 
6. Id. at 643; see infra text accompanying note 84. 
7. 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1940 (1992). 
8. 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988). 
9. Schad v. Arizona, III S. Ct. 2491 (1991). 
10. 18 U.S.c. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi­
zations Act was enacted as title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988». 
11. Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 
1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1988». This Act compiled over 50 
drug control laws into a single comprehensive regulatory scheme. H.R. REP. No. 1444, 
91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4571. 
12. H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note II, at 4566. 
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of criminal punishment for drug violations.13 Previous legislation in 
the area of drug abuse prevention and control had been diverse and 
often duplicative. 14 The Act set out to collect these laws "in one piece 
of legislation based upon new scientific information . . . and greater 
information concerning the scope of the problem."15 
The Act was a full-fledged attack on illegal drug trafficking. 16 
Congress recognized that the drug problem was a growing concern 
that appeared "to be approaching epidemic proportions,"17 and that 
was in need of immediate and focused attention. With the Act, Con­
gress provided a structured method of both punishment and rehabili­
tation in an effort to bring a halt to the rapidly growing problem of 
drug abuse in this country.18 
The CCEI9 specifically targeted drug "kingpins," or those per­
sons within a narcotics operation holding a position of management 
and authority. 20 The Supreme Court has referred to the CCE as a 
carefully constructed provision of the Act which aims to reach and 
punish "the 'top brass' in the drug rings, not the lieutenants and foot 
soldiers."21 Courts have recognized that Congress used the CCE sec­
tion of the Act to deter "large-scale profit-making enterprises engaged 
in the illegal importation, manufacture and distribution of controlled 
substances."22 
13. Id. at 4567. 
14. Id. at 4571. Since 1914, Congress had passed more than 50 pieces of legislation 
addressing control of narcotics and dangerous drugs. [d. 
15. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1988). 
16. H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note 11, at 4575. 
17. Id. at 4572. 
18. Id. at 4575. 
19. The CCE was originally passed as § 408 of the Drug Abuse Prevention and Con­
trol Act of 1970, PUb. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 1265 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848 
(1988». 
20. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A). Section 848(c) states as follows: 
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a continuing 
criminal enterprise if­
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chap­
ter the punishment for which is a felony, and 
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this sub­
chapter or subchapter II of this chapter­
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more 
other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of 
organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management, 
and 
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources. 
Id. 
21. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 781 (1985). 
22. See. e.g., United States v. Valenzuela. 596 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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Violation of the CCE leads to harsh penalties, including a 
mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years in prison23 and, under 
certain conditions, mandatory life imprisonment24 or the death pen­
alty.25 In an effort to assure that only professional criminals who filled 
the rank of drug lord or "kingpin" would be convicted under the 
CCE, Congress structured the statute to describe a complex statutory 
crime.26 Conviction under the CCE requires, first, that the defendant 
commit a number of predicate narcotics offenses,27 and, second, that 
the defendant's criminal acts meet a number of additional 
conditions.28 
Section 848( c) outlines the requirements for a CCE violation.29 
While the predicate offense required for CCE prosecution is any drug­
related felony within the Act,30 the accused must have committed that 
predicate crime as part of a "continuing series" of violations.3! Fur­
thermore, the defendant must undertake this series of drug-related vio­
lations in the position of supervisor or manager of at least five other 
individuals,32 while obtaining substantial income or gain therefrom. 33 
The CCE provision was enacted because Congress acknowledged 
that the drug enforcement laws of the past had been "for the most 
part, ineffective in halting the increased upsurge of drug abuse 
23. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988). 
24. Id. § 848(b). 
25. Id. § 848(e). 
26. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 146 (1977). The most widely recognized 
complex statutory crime is RICO, which was enacted, like the CCE, in 1970. See supra 
note 10. The complex statutory crime is relatively modem but has its roots in long-recog­
nized federal crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (Mail Fraud Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1988) 
(Travel Act). 
27. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(I). 
28. [d. § 848(c)(2); see supra note 20. 
29. See supra note 20. 
30. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(I). The prohibited drug-related acts appear in §§ 841(a), 
842(a), and 960(a), and encompass all illegal drug-related activity. 
3J. [d. § 848(c)(2). The circuits disagree as to precisely how many violations consti­
tute a "continuing series" for purposes of the CCE statute. Several circuits recognize a 
continuing series to be three or more violative acts. United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 
638,642 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 747 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating, 
in addition, that the predicate violations do not necessarily have to be convictions), cert. 
denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); United States v. Collier, 358 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (E.D. Mich. 
1973), aff'd per curiam, 493 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1974). Conversely, the Seventh Circuit has 
interpreted a continuing series to be only two or more acts. United States V. Kramer, 955 
F.2d 479, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1992); United States V. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 946 (7th Cir. 
1991), cerro denied, 112 S. Ct: 1940 (1992); United States V. Baker, 905 F.2d 1100, 1104 
(7th Cir.), cerro denied, 498 U.S. 876 (1990). 
32. § 848(c)(2)(A); see supra note 20. 
33. § 848(c)(2)(B); see supra note 20. 
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throughout our United States."34 Debates prior to the provision's en­
actment indicate that the statute was not aimed at "the casua1 drug 
user and experimenter,"3S but rather at the "professiona1 crlmina1."36 
These comments indicate Congress' concern that the statutory lan­
guage be structured in a manner that would punish only drug "king­
pins," and not lesser drug offenders. 
While debating the issue, Congress evaluated two different meth­
ods of achieving its aim. Originally, the CCE was introduced into the 
House of Representatives as a "recidivist provision"37 that provided 
"special penalties ... for these special criminals."38 Under that ap­
proach, the jury would only eva1uate "evidence concerning the basic 
crime which has been charged."39 Under the proposed version, a pro­
cedure would be implemented, after conviction and before sentencing, 
to identify those defendants guilty of running criminal drug enter­
prises who were worthy of enhanced punishment.40 However, Con­
gress rejected this recidivist approach, concluding that it would raise 
due process problems because the defendant would be unaware of 
what evidence was submitted to the judge during sentencing.41 
Congress enacted a second method, which embodied an offense 
approach.42 This approach defined the CCE crime as a new and sepa­
rate offense.43 The government would have to prove all the require­
ments of the CCE offense at trial, making prior drug violations 
elements of the CCE charge instead of regarding them as evidence to 
34. 116 CONGo REC. 33,630 (1970). This is consistent with the overall purpose ofthe 
Act. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
35. 116 CONGo REC. 33,631 (1970). 
36. Id. (remarks of Rep. Poff, sponsor of amendment adding §§ 409-410). 
37. Garrett V. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 783 (1985) (considering the congressional 
debate on the two versions of the CCE). 
38. 116 CONGo REC. 33,630 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poll). 
39. Id. 
40. Ga"ett, 471 U.S. at 783. The factors presently listed in subsection two of the 
CCE would have been presented to the judge prior to sentencing to establish the need for 
increased punishment of a particular defendant. See supra note 20. . 
41. 116 CONGo REC. 33,631 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt). Representative Eck­
hardt, while criticizing the recidivist approach, stated, "[b]ut we would be making a terrible 
mistake if, because of its emotional impact, we should throwaway due process oflaw." Id. 
His concern was that the recidivist approach permitted a defendant's sentence to be "en­
hanced from 5 to 25 years without his knowing what the evidence against him was and 
what the matter is all about." Id. He supported the second approach, which assured that 
"if you are going to prove a man guilty, you have to come into court and prove every 
element of the continuing criminal offense." Id. 
42. Id.; see Ga"ett, 471 U.S..at 783. 
43. See H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note II, at 4566. 
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be weighed at the time of sentencing.44 Congress hailed this approach 
as being in line with the "traditional American criminal process,"4S 
which requires that the government prove each element of an offense 
at trial.46 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the CCE created a sepa­
rate criminal offense under which Congress intended to allow prosecu­
tion for both the predicate offenses and the CCE offense itself.47 In 
addition, courts have repeatedly upheld the CCE's harsh penalties in 
the face of criminal defendants' arguments that the statute is 
unconstitutional.48 
Through the CCE statute, Congress has provided a powerful 
weapon against the serious drug offender. The various elements of the 
statute49 seek to assure that a defendant convicted of a CCE offense is 
an individual who fills the role of drug lord or "kingpin." Those ele­
ments, however, give rise to problems of jury concurrence because a 
general verdict of guilt on the CCE charge does not assure that the 
jurors agreed, either unanimously, or even by a substantial majority, 
upon which of the defendant's acts constituted the "continuing 
series."50 
B. Jury Unanimity in Federal Criminal Trials 
The constitutional guarantee of a right to trial by jury is embod­
ied in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. 5 1 The Supreme 
44. 116 CONGo REC. 33,631 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt); see 21 U.S.C. 
§ 848(c)(I) (1988). 
45. 116 CONGo REC. 33,631 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt). 
46. Id. 
47. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 786 (1985). 
48. United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1529 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 
U.S. 1100 (1985) (holding that the CCE does not violate the defendant's due process 
rights); United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 588 n.7 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 1188 (1985) (recognizing that the CCE was not void for vagueness on its face); United 
States v. Jones, 438 F.2d 461, 467-68 (7th Cir. 1971) (concluding that provisions of the 
CCE did not unconstitutionally encroach on judicial authority); United States v. Lozaw, 
427 F.2d 911, 917 (2d Cir. 1970) (upholding the constitutionality of the CCE's mandated 
prohibition of probation). 
49. See supra note 20. 
50. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2) (1988); see supra note 20. 
51. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. That amendment states, 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con­
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Id. 
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Court has concluded that this guarantee is "a fundamental right, es­
sential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair 
trials are provided for all defendants."52 In criminal cases, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that a trial by jury provides "indispen­
sable protection against the possibility of governmental oppression, "53 
and allows the defendant's guilt or innocence to be determined by a 
group of lay people whose common-sense judgment stands between 
the accused and his or her accuser. 54 
In addition to a trial by jury, the defendant in a federal criminal 
trial has a right to a unanimous jury verdict. 55 While, in the past, 
courts recognized that the Sixth Amendment was the source of the 
federal criminal defendant's right to jury unanimity,56 the United 
States Supreme Court has recently indicated that the question of juror 
agreement on factual issues should be interpreted under due process. 57 
Although the Court did not reach the unanimity issue, it interpreted 
the problem of "verdict specificity" under due process. 58 Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 31(a) requires unanimous jury verdicts for the 
purpose of protecting a defendant's constitutional rights. 59 Conflicting 
52. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968) (recognizing the extension of the 
right to a trial by jury to state criminal proceedings via the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
53. Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 330 (1980). 
54. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). 
55. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 
356, 366, 380 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Andres v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948); United States v. Schiff, 801 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 480 U.S. 945 (1987). 
In Apodaca, the Court noted four theories of the origin of the unanimity requirement, 
but did not attempt to define the scope of this right. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407 n.2. First, 
the Court recognized that the requirement of juror unanimity might have developed in 
order to counteract a lack of other rules to ensure the defendant a fair trial. Id. Second, 
the Court noted that the requirement may have arisen from the ancient system of trial by 
compurgation, which added to the number of compurgators until one party had gained the 
support of twelve. Id. Third, the Court recognized the possibility that the practice of 
unanimity developed because in medieval times minority jurors would be guilty of criminal 
perjury. Id. Finally, the Court noted the possibility that jury unanimity arose from the 
concept of consent, which carried with it the idea of unanimity. Id. 
56. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 356; Andres, 333 U.S. at 740; Schiff, 801 F.2d at 108. 
57. Schad v. Arizona, III S. Ct. 2491, 2498 n.5. (1991). 
58. Id. According to the Supreme Court decision, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 
(1970), due process requires that every essential element of a crime must be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The prosecution must meet that standard of proof for every fact neces­
sary to establish the crime charged. Id. at 364; see infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
This case is not, however, of much assistance in determining the degree of factual specificity 
needed to satisfy the reasonable doubt standard. 
59. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a). The rule states, "[t]he verdict shall be unanimous." Id.; 
see also United States v. Essex, 734 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the trial court 
committed plain error by allowing II jurors to decide the case when the court did not 
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decisions in the Seventh and Third Circuits indicate, however, that 
uncertainty remains over the scope and extent of the unanimity 
requirement.6O 
Jury unanimity" 'means more than a conclusory agreement that 
the defendant has violated the statute in question; there is a require­
ment of substantial agreement as to the principal factual elements un­
derlying a specified offense.' "61 General unanimity occurs when the 
jurors are in agreement on a general proposition, such as that the de­
fendant is guilty of the charged offense.62 Specific unanimity, on the 
other hand, requires that the trial court "augment the general instruc­
tion to ensure the jury understands its duty to unanimously agree to a 
particular set of facts. "63 
In the ordinary case, a general unanimity instruction will suffice 
to protect the defendant's constitutional rights.64 However, several 
attempt to locate the missing juror, even though the defendant had waived a full 12 person 
jury). 
60. See United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that a general 
unanimity instruction on the "continuing series" element was sufficient), cert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 1940 (1992); United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988) (requiring a 
specific unanimity instruction to assure that each juror specifically agreed upon the precise 
violations the defendant committed that constituted the "continuing series"); see infra 
notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
61. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 n.5 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concur­
ring) (quoting United States v. Ferris, 719 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1983». 
62. Ferris, 719 F.2d at 1407 (holding that a general unanimity instruction suffices 
when presentation of a case involving multiple acts within one count of an indictment is so 
clear that unanimity can be presumed). 
63. United States v. Echeverry, 719 F.2d 974, 975 (9th Cir. 1983). 
64. United States v. Hemandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1572 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that the district court's general unanimity instruction on the "continuing series" 
element of a CCE charged offense was harmless upon finding that the jury had unani­
mously agreed on the three predicate offenses), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1003 (1990); United 
States v. Anguiano, 873 F.2d 1314, 1321 (9th Cir.) (holding that the district court's failure 
to give a specific unanimity instruction was not plain error in a conspiracy case where the 
court found no possibility of juror confusion), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989); Ferris, 719 
F.2d at 1407 (holding that, in a case involving possession of controlled substances with 
intent to distribute, conspiracy to distribute, and drug distribution, the indictment was 
"sufficiently simple and clear in its presentation" to necessitate only a general unanimity 
instruction). 
In Hernandez-Escarsega, for example, the trial court gave a general instruction that in 
order to convict the defendant, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
alleged "offenses were part of three or more offenses committed by the Defendant over a 
definite period of time in violation of the federal narcotics laws which make it a crime to 
conspire to import and distribute marijuana." 886 F.2d at 1573. While this instruction 
stated that the offenses must be violations of the federal narcotics laws, thus satisfying the 
first part of the CCE, it does not require unanimity as to which offenses were committed. 
Id. In Ferris, the trial court's general unanimity instruction "stated simply that the jury's 
verdict must be unanimous." 719 F.2d at 1407. 
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circuits have concluded that a specific unanimity instruction is war­
ranted when the criminal statute involved is sufficiently complex.6s 
For instance, in United States v. Anguiano,66 the court identified a 
number of situations that provoked a "genuine possibility ofjuror con­
fusion,"67 thus necessitating specific juror unanimity.68 According to 
65. United States v. Jerome, 942 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring specific 
unanimity as to the identity of the five persons supervised by the defendant in a CCE case); 
United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 929 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the district court's 
failure to give a specific unanimity instruction in a peIjury case was reversible error because 
"there was a reasonable possibility that the jury was not unanimous with respect to at least 
one statement in each count"); United States v. Sanchez, 914 F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 
1990) (concluding that a specific unanimity instruction was not necessary in a case involv­
ing the crime of assaulting a federal officer, but recognizing in dicta the need for specific 
juror unanimity when different jurors may have convicted the defendant based on different 
facts due to complex evidence, a discrepancy between the evidence and the indictment, or 
some other factor presenting a substantial possibility of juror confusion), cert. denied, III 
S. Ct. 1626 (1991); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding 
that the defendant, Oliver L. North, who was charged with crimes relating to a congres­
sional investigation, was entitled to a specific unanimity instruction where various permuta­
tions would have supported a valid conviction, presenting a real and significant possibility 
ofjuror confusion), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991); Uni~ed States v. Mobile Materials, 
Inc., 881 F.2d 866, 874-75 (10th Cir. 1989) (recognizing the appropriateness of the district 
court's specific jury instruction which required the jury to find the single, continuing con­
spiracy charged in the indictment), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1043 (1990); United States v. 
Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104, 1114 (6th Cir. 1988) (concluding that where a single count 
charged two separate false statements, the jury must have been unanimous as to at least one 
specific statement), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1025 (1990); United States v. Gilley, 836 F.2d 
1206, 1211-13 (9th Cir.) (acknowledging the sufficiency of a general unanimity instruction 
in the usual case, but holding that a specific unanimity instruction should have been given 
where the charge of conducting an illegal gambling business raised the possibility of less 
than unanimous juror agreement on the period in which five individuals were continually 
involved), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 219 (1988); United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 460 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (concluding that the trial court should have instructed the jury that they must 
reach unanimous agreement regarding which of the defendant's acts constituted each ele­
ment of the charged offense); United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1020 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(holding that when a count will be submitted to the court on alternative theories, prudence 
counsels the trial court to give an augmented instruction if requested); United States v. 
Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing the necessity for specific unanimity 
in a case where the defendant's acts of extortion were directed at separate victims, occurred 
at different times and places, involved different approaches of relying on threats, and were 
committed by fluctuating numbers of individuals); Echeverry, 719 F.2d at 975 (finding the 
district court's general unanimity instruction on the defendant's drug conspiracy and distri­
bution charges ambiguous, and reversing the defendant's conviction on those charges). 
66. 873 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989). 
67. Id. at 1319. 
68. Id. First, the court held that a specific unanimity instruction is required in con­
spiracy cases where the jury indicates that it is confused about the nature of the charge. 
Id.; see also United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1988); United States 
v. Gilley, 836 F.2d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 219 (1988); Echeverry, 719 
F.2d at 975 (stating that the jury's questions indicated their confusion regarding mUltiple 
conspiracies and that such inquiry should have alerted the trial judge to the likelihood of a 
non-unanimous verdict). Second, the court noted that a specific unanimity instruction 
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, "[w]hen 
'there is a genuine possibility of jury confusion or that a conviction 
may occur as the result of different jurors concluding that the defend­
ant committed different acts,' "69 the trial court is obligated to ensure 
that the jury " 'understands its duty to unanimously agree to a partic­
ular set of facts.' "70 
Generally, the unanimous verdict rule "requires jurors to be in 
substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did as a step prelimi­
nary to determining whether the defendant is guilty of the crime 
charged."71 This requirement ordinarily extends to all issues left for 
resolution by the jury.72 It is not clear whether the jurors in a CCE 
trial must specifically agree on which of the defendant's drug viola­
tions constitute the "continuing series" under the statute.73 




The CCE statute requires that the defendant commit a drug-re­
lated felony74 that is "part of a continuing series of violations"75 "un­
dertaken by such person in concert with five or more other persons 
with respect to whom such person occupies a position of ... manage­
ment."76 Thus, the CCE statute contains two parts.77 First, the de-
might be necessary when the indictment was sufficiently factually complex to indicate the 
possibility of jury confusion. Anguiano, 873 F.2d at 1320; see also Gilley, 836 F.2d at 1211­
12. Third, the Ninth Circuit indicated that cases in which the jury is likely to be confused 
because the indictment is particularly broad and ambiguous would necessitate a specific 
unanimity instruction. Anguiano, 873 F.2d at 1319; see, e.g., Gordon, 844 F.2d at 1401 
(concluding that the first count of the indictment, charging the defendant with two different 
acts of conspiracy, presented a distinct possibility of jury confusion as to upon which of the 
defendant's acts the jury had unanimously agreed). 
69. United States v. Powell, 932 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
256 (1991) (quoting United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1986». 
70. Payseno, 782 F.2d at 836 (quoting Echeverry, 719 F.2d at 975). 
71. United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453,457-58 (5th Cir. 1977). 
72. Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948). 
73. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
74. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(1) (1988); see supra note 30. 
75. § 848(c)(2); see supra note 20. 
76. § 848(c)(2)(A); see supra note 20. The statute goes on to require that the defend­
ant obtain substantial income from the aforementioned violative activity. § 848(c)(2)(B). 
77. The CCE does not expressly state that the "continuing series" and "five or more 
underlings" provisions are indeed elements of the crime. The legislative history of the stat­
ute, however, indicates that the "continuing series" provision was indeed meant as an ele­
ment. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text. As the Supreme Court noted, the 
version of the CCE that was adopted "made engagement in a continuing criminal enter­
prise a new and distinct offense with all its elements triable in court." Garrett v. United 
States, 471 U.S. 773, 783 (1985) (emphasis added). The courts seem to treat the "five or 
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fendant must commit a "continuing series" of violations.78 Second, 
the defendant must supervise or manage five or more underlings. 79 
Jury unanimity is not expressly addressed or required in any part 
of the CCE. As for the five or more underlings provision, all but one 
of the courts of appea1s that have considered the issue have concluded 
that the Constitution does not require the jury to agree on the specific 
identities of the five or more individua1s that the defendant managed 
or supervised.80 Furthermore, the courts do not require that the de­
fendant's supervisory actions occur simultaneously with all of the five 
or more underlings. 8 1 The supervision prong of the statute is satisfied, 
therefore, even when the prosecution can only establish the defend­
ant's supervision of five or more different co-conspirators at various 
times during the enterprise. 82 
Conversely, the "continuing series" element of the CCE statute 
has given rise to a conflict among the circuits regarding the appropri­
ateness of specific versus genera1 juror unanimity. In United States v. 
Echeverri,83 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
concluded that the jury must unanimously agree as to which of the 
more underlings" requirement as "peripheral" to the CCE's purpose and do not require 
unanimity as to that part of the statute. See infra note 80. This Note does not take a 
position on the validity of that view of the "five or more underlings" requirement. The 
"continuing series" provision, on the other hand, addresses the substantive predicate acts 
that the defendant must commit to be found guilty of a CCE charge and is, no doubt, the 
part of the statute to which the Court referred in Garrett when it spoke of the elements of 
the CCE offense. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 783. 
78. 21 U.S.c. § 848(c)(2); see supra note 20. 
79. § 848(c)(2)(A); see supra note 20. 
80. United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (not requiring spe­
cific unanimity); see also United States v. Moorman, 944 F.2d 801, 803 (11th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1766 (1992); United States v. English, 925 F.2d 154, 159 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2812 (1991); United States v. Linn, 889 F.2d 1369, 1374 (5th Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 809 (1990); United States v. Tarvers, 833 F.2d 1068, 1075 (1st 
Cir. 1987); United States v. Markowski, 772 F.2d 358, 364 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 
U.S. 1018 (1986). But see United States v. Jerome, 942 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1991) (requir­
ing specific unanimity, reasoning that the number of persons involved presented a genuine 
possibility of juror confusion). 
81. United States v. Bafia, 949 F.2d 1465,1470-71 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 1989 (1992); United States v. Jenkins, 904 F.2d 549, 553-54 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 962 (1990); United States v. Ricks, 882 F.2d 885, 891 (4th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Fernandez, 822 F.2d 382, 386 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987); United 
States v. Boldin, 818 F.2d 771, 775-76 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Lueth, 807 F.2d 
719,731 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Burt, 765 F.2d 1364, 1366 (9th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 747 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); 
United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1034 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 
(1982). 
82. Bafia, 949 F.2d at 1471. 
83. 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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defendant's particular violations constituted the "continuing series" 
under the CCE.84 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
reached a contrary decision on similar facts in United States v. 
Canino. 85 In that case, the court held that the jury was not required to 
reach unanimity as to the specific acts constituting the "continuing 
series."86 According to the Canino majority, the constitutional re­
quirement of juror unanimity in federal criminal trials is satisfied in a 
CCE case when each juror finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed a "continuing series" of violations under the 
CCE statute. 87 
A. United States v. Echeverri88 
In Echeverri, the defendant, Elkin Echeverri, was convicted on 
five drug-related charges after a trial involving seven other defend­
ants.89 Echeverri was accused and convicted of operating a continuing 
criminal enterprise between January 1977 and August 1984.90 At 
trial, the prosecution relied primarily on the testimony of four 
unindicted co-conspirators.91 Despite Echeverri's testimony, in which 
he maintained his innocence, the jury convicted him on all five counts, 
84. Id. at 643. 
85. 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cerr. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1940 (1992). 
86. Id. at 947-48; see also United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1992). In 
Kramer, the court briefly addressed the defendant's jury unanimity argument. Kramer, 
955 F.2d at 486-87. The defendant claimed that the jury must be instructed to agree upon 
the precise acts they relied on to find a CCE "continuing series." The court simply fol­
lowed Canino in finding the trial court's general unanimity instruction sufficient and the 
defendant's unanimity argument unavailing. Id. 
87. Canino, 949 F.2d at 947-48. 
88. 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988). 
89. Id. at 639. The jury convicted all but one of the defendants on one or more of 
the five counts. Echeverri was convicted of all five counts: (1) a RICO conspiracy, (2) a 
substantive RICO offense, (3) operation of a continuing criminal enterprise, (4) a drug­
related conspiracy in violation of21 U.S.C. § 846, and (5) possession of cocaine with intent 
to distribute. Id. at 641. Defendant Susan Commorato was acquitted of the only charge 
for which she was tried. Id. at 641 n.2. 
In 1969, Echeverri emigrated from Columbia to the United States and by 1977 had 
established a drug distribution operation out of his apartment where he lived with his 
brother in Elizabethtown, New Jersey. Id. at 640. Echeverri's drug business operated in 
five states-New Jersey, California, Florida, Texas, and Colorado-and involved several 
other individuals as conduits, distributors, and couriers. Id. The operation flourished until 
1982, when Echeverri's brother was murdered in New York. Id. The murder led to a 
police investigation of the Echeverri apartment, which revealed drugs, drug paraphernalia, 
$45,000 in cash, and notebooks containing drug distribution records. Id. 
90. Id. at 641. 
91. Id. at 640. The four individuals who testified were unindicted co-conspirators 
who had been given immunity or other benefits for their testimony. Id. 
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including a CCE violation.92 
On appeal, Echeverri raised several objections.93 Of particular 
importance, he alleged that the trial judge erroneously gave the jury 
only a general unanimity instruction on the "continuing series" ele­
ment of the CCE statute.94 The prosecution alleged that the defendant 
had committed several different drug transactions.95 Echeverri main­
tained that conviction under the CCE required specific jury unanimity 
upon precisely which of those transactions the jury relied in finding a 
"continuing series."96 As a result, Echeverri contended that the trial 
court's refusal to give his requested instruction amounted to reversible 
error.97 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with Echeverri 
and reversed his conviction.98 The court reasoned "that a significant 
potential for jury confusion" on the CCE count existed to warrant 
more than the general unanimity instruction given by the trial court. 99 
The Third Circuit's holding was primarily based on its prior holding 
in United States v. Beros .100 
In Beros, a union officer was convicted of violating two federal 
statutes that prohibited the wilful misuse of union funds lOl and em­
ployee welfare benefit plan funds. 102 The defendant was also convicted 
92. See supra note 89. 
93. Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 639. Echeverri alleged that his convictions could not 
stand because (I) the district court refused to give his requested jury instruction which 
addressed the need for unanimous agreement on the specific acts the jury found the defend­
ant to have committed which established a "continuing series of violations" under the 
CCE, (2) on two occasions the district court admitted certain evidence of other, uncharged 
criminal conduct, in error, and (3) the predicate acts that the jury found under RICO did 
not establish a "pattern" under that statute. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 640-41. 
96. Id. at 642. 
97. Id. Echeverri had requested that the trial judge give the jury the following 
instruction: 
The second element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
is that this offense was part of a continuing series of violations of the federal 
narcotics laws. A continuing series of violations is three or more violations of the 
federal narcotics laws committed over a definite period of time. 
You must unanimously agree on which three acts constitute the continuing 
series of violations. 
Id. See supra note 31 for a discussion of the conftict that exists among the circuits as to 
whether a "continuing series" requires two or three narcotics violations. 
98. Id. at 643. 
99. Id. 
100. 833 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1987); see Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 642. 
101. 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1988). 
102. 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1988). 
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of conspiring with another individual to commit these offenses. 103 At 
trial, the judge refused to instruct the jurors that they must reach 
unanimous agreement with respect to which of the defendant's acts 
constituted each element of the crime charged. The Third Circuit con­
cluded that this refusal was erroneous. 104 
The Echeverri court analogized the facts before it to the circum­
stances in Beros. 105 Although the Beros case did not involve the CCE 
statute, it did involve two complex crimes that required a number of 
underlying predicate acts to constitute the charged offense. 106 The 
Echeverri court reasoned that the comparable complexity of these stat­
utes was sufficient to make the two cases "indistinguishable." 107 
The court concluded that, due to the spectrum of choices by 
which the jury could have come to its verdict and the possibility that 
jurors could have disagreed as to precisely which of the defendant's 
acts supported a conviction, a sufficiently strong potential for jury mis­
understanding and confusion existed to necessitate a specific unanim­
ity instruction. lOS This decision was primarily based upon the theory 
that the complexity of the crime determines the need for a specific 
unanimity instruction. 109 
The courts in both Echeverri and Beros premised their reasoning 
on United States v. Gipson. 110 In Gipson, the defendant was charged 
with violating a federal statute that prohibited receiving, concealing, 
storing, bartering, selling, or disposing of stolen vehicles moving in 
interstate commerce. III The Gipson court found that violation of this 
statute could arise from one of several specific acts and, therefore, 
103. Beros, 833 F.2d at 457. 
104. Id. at 458. The appellate court in Beros reasoned that "the range of possibilities 
by which the jury could have reached its verdict, and the possibility that individual jurors 
reasonably could have disagreed as to which act supported the guilt," necessitated the use 
of a clear unanimity instruction. Id. 
105. United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 642-43 (3d Cir. 1988). 
106. Both statutes at issue in Beros required embezzling, stealing, abstracting, and 
converting certain funds to one's own use for violation of the specified offense. Beros, 833 
F.2d at 459; see also 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1988). 
107. Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 643. 
108. Id. at 642-43. 
109. Id. See supra note 65 and accompanying text for a discussion of this approach 
as it has been applied to a number of complex statutes. 
The Echeverri opinion also referred to the trial court's treatment of the defendant's 
RICO charge and indicated that the specific instruction that was given with respect to the 
RICO charge should have also been given on the CCE charge. Id. at 643. See infra note 
264 for a discussion of the court's suggestion. 
110. 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977). 
Ill. Id. at 455; see National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 
§ 101(1)(I)(a), 62 Stat. 806 (1948) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2313 (1988». 
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presented a jury unanimity problem. 112 The court reasoned that, in 
order to assure unanimity, the jury was required to substantially agree 
on exactly what acts the defendant had committed before he could be 
convicted. l13 As a result, the Fifth Circuit concluded that when there 
is a potential for jury confusion or a less than unanimous verdict due 
to the presence of a single, criminal statute that prohibits a number of 
acts, the defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict 
would not be preserved by the jury's simple consensus on guilt "unless 
[a] prerequisite of jury consensus as to the defendant's course of action 
is also required."1l4 
The Third Circuit in Echeverri reasoned that the Gipson rationale 
was applicable in a case involving the CCE. 1lS Because the district 
court's jury instruction merely informed the jury that the term "con­
tinuing series" meant three or more drug-related offenses, it failed to 
assure unanimous juror agreement that the defendant committed the 
same three violations.1l6 Consequently, the Echeverri court found 
these circumstances and the CCE statute to be sufficiently confusing to 
the jury to warrant more than the district court's general unanimity 
instruction. 117 
B. United States v. Caninol18 
In Canino, the defendant, Michael J. Canino, was convicted of a 
marijuana distribution conspiracy and of engaging in a continuing 
criminal enterprise. I 19 The grand jury indictment specified five trans­
actions, from 1982 until 1986,120 in which Canino headed an organiza­
tion that accepted drug shipments for storage and sale l2l in violation 
112. Gipson, 553 F.2d at 456-57. 
113. Id. at 457-58. 
114. Id. at 458. 
115. United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 1988). 
116. [d. Some courts recognize that two, rather than three, violations establish a 
continuing series. See supra note 31. 
117. Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 643. 
118. 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1940 (1992). 
119. Id. at 932. The remaining defendants were convicted of conspiracy to distribute 
in excess of 1000 pounds of marijuana. Id. Canino and his fellow defendants were in­
volved in the notorious "Randy Lanier-Benjamin Kramer" drug operation, which was re­
sponsible for importing over 600,000 pounds of marijuana into the United States over a 
period of ten years. Id. at 933. 
120. In 1986, a barge load of marijuana that was shipped to San Francisco, Califor­
nia en route to Pennsylvania was interdicted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Id. at 
934. 
121. Id. at 933. Canino had originally acted as a mere purchaser from the Lanier 
organization. Beginning in 1982, however, he increased his participation and eventually 
became a major player in the Lanier drug ring. Id. at 933-34. 
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of the federal drug conspiracy laws. 122 
Canino raised an objection to the lower court's general unanimity 
instruction with respect to the "continuing series" element of the CCE 
count. 123 Canino argued that the jury should have been instructed 
that they must unanimously agree upon which of the drug offenses 
offered into evidence by the government established the continuing se­
ries necessary for CCE conviction. 124 His argument was primarily 
based upon the holding in Echeverri and Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 31(a).12S 
The Canino court noted that the Third Circuit in Echeverri found 
reversible error in the district court's failure to charge the jury that it 
must unanimously agree as to which of the defendant's acts consti­
tuted a "continuing series of violations" under the CCE.126 After a 
brief reference to the Sixth Amendment requirement of a unanimous 
jury verdict,127 the Canino majority discussed the basis of the 
Echeverri court's reasoning and concluded that the CCE was quite dif­
ferent from the criminal statutes which the Echeverri court had analo­
gized to the CCE.128 
122. Id. 
123. 	 Id. at 945-46. The trial court gave the following jury instruction: 
Thus, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty 
of conspiracy to distribute more than 1,000 pounds of marijuana as charged in 
Count II and/or that he is gUilty of knowingly and intentionally distributing ma­
rijuana or possessing with intent to distribute marijuana as set forth in paragraphs 
A through E of Count I of the indictment or he is guilty of knowingly and inten­
tionally distributing or possessing with intent to distribute marijuana from a Ja­
maica Load in 1984, and that this conduct, together with any additional 
violations of the federal drug laws constituted a total of three or more violations 
of the federal drug laws committed over the period of time charged in Count I 
with a single or similar purpose. This will constitute a finding that the defendant 
engaged in a continuing series of violations. 
Id. at 944 (emphasis added). 
124. Id. at 945-46~ 
125. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a); see supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
126. United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 946 (7th Cir. 1991), cen. denied, 112 S. 
Ct. 1940 (1992); see supra note 84 and accompanying text. The Canino majority briefly 
acknowledged, in a footnote, the Sixth Amendment requirement of a unanimous jury ver­
dict, set out in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(a). Canino, 949 F.2d at 946 n.5. 
127. Canino, 949 F.2d at 946 n.5. Prior to the Canino decision, the Supreme Court 
had characterized the criminal defendant's right to jury unanimity as a due process right. 
Schad v. Arizona, III S. Ct. 2491 (1991). Thus, it is not clear why the Canino court 
interpreted that right under the Sixth Amendment. 
128. Canino, 949 F.2d at 946 n.6. See supra notes 101-02, III and accompanying 
text for reference to the criminal statutes the Echeverri court compared to the CCE. 
The Echeverri court had relied on the reasoning in United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 
455 (3d Cir. 1987). United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638,642-43 (3d Cir. 1988). The 
Beros court relied on United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d453 (5th Cir. 1977), as support for 
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The Canino court also noted that, in United States v. Gipson, 129 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit required specific unanimity 
because it concluded that the acts listed in the statute at issue130 were 
so diverse that, absent a specific unanimity instruction, it would be 
uncertain whether the jury found the defendant guilty of one class of 
offense or another}31 The Canino court distinguished Gipson by rea­
soning that the dichotomy created by the statute in Gipson was not 
present in the CCE.132 The court then went on to conclude that the 
"expansive breadth of culpable offenses suitable for CCE treat­
ment"133 diminished the need to determine precisely which acts each 
juror attributed to the defendant}34 Therefore, the court found that 
the proper focus of the CCE analysis should be on the frequency of the 
defendant's participation in conspiratorial drug offenses, "rather than 
any particularization of the acts used to demonstrate 'continuous.' "135 
The Canino court also rejected the defendant's argument con­
cerning the significance of the Echeverri 136 case and referred to United 
States v. Jackson.137 In Jackson, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit held that the specific unanimity it had required 
in Echeverri, 138 with respect to the "continuing series" element of the 
CCE, did not apply to the part of the statute that required the CCE 
defendant to supervise five or more underlings. 139 The Jackson court 
reasoned that while the "continuing series" element focused on the 
conduct that the CCE sought to punish, the identity of the five or 
more underlings was only "peripheral" to the statute's other concern, 
the conclusion that jury unanimity was required regarding the predicate acts of the CCE 
charge. Beros, 833 F.2d at 460. 
129. 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977). 
130. The statute at issue in Gipson prohibited receiving, concealing, storing, bar· 
tering, selling, or disposing of stolen cars. See supra note III and accompanying text. 
131. Canino, 949 F.2d at 946 n.6; see Gipson, 553 F.2d at 458. 
132. Canino, 949 F.2d at 946 n.6. 
133. Id. But see infra note 146 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress' 
intent in enacting the CCE, which arguably limits the CCE's breadth by covering only 
those individuals holding superior positions in the drug ring hierarchies. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 948 n.7 .. The Canino court was concerned that the danger in carrying the 
jury unanimity requirement too far would be to require unanimity on specific details that 
are really more particularired than the statutory language intends. Id. See also Hayden J. 
Trubitt, Patchwork Verdicts, Different·Jurors Verdicts, and American Jury Theory; 
Whether Verdicts Are Invalidated by Juror Disagreement on Issues, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 473, 
550 (1983). 
136. United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988). 
137. 879 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1989); see Canino, 949 F.2d at 946. 
138. See supra text accompanying note 84. 
139. Jackson, 879 F.2d at 88·89. The court did not require specific unanimity as to 
the identity of the five or more underlings. Id. 
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that the defendant exercise a certain level of control over a sizeable 
operation. l40 In other words, the Jackson court had determined that 
the specific identity of the five or more underlings was only "periph­
eral" to the concern that the defendant actually fill the rank of drug 
"kingpin." 141 The Canino court stated that Jackson thus represented 
a "cautious departure" from the Third Circuit's previous decision in 
Echeverri. 142 
However, the Canino court went on to disagree with the Jackson 
rationale, finding no basis for distinguishing between the "continuing 
series" and "five or more underlings" elements for purposes of juror 
unanimity. 143 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that the reasoning in two of its own opinions, 144 
which recognized the sufficiency of a general unanimity instruction for 
the "five or more underlings" requirement, should also apply, byanal­
ogy, to the CCE's "continuing series" element. 14S As support for this 
conclusion, the court identified the purpose of the CCE statute as pun­
ishing and deterring large and profitable drug operations. 146 There­
fore, the Canino court reasoned that requiring specific unanimity on 
the defendant's "continuing series" of predicate acts would run 
counter to the CCE's general purpose of deterring large-scale drug 
rings. 147 The court feared that the particularization involved with re­
quiring specific unanimity might result in unjustified acquittals. 148 
The Canino court analogized the "five or more underlings" ele­
ment, and the lack of specificity required thereunder, with the "contin­
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 946-47 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 1940 (1992). 
143. Id. at 947. 
144. United States V. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1988); United States V. Markow­
ski, 772 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1985). 
145. Canino, 949 F.2d at 947. 
146. Id. The court relied on United States V. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th 
Cir. 1979), for its articulation of the purpose of the CCE. Canino, 949 F.2d at 947. 
However, the Canino court's analysis failed to address the fact that the CCE is limited 
in scope because it seeks to punish only drug "kingpins." The court instead focused only 
upon the "expansive breadth" of the predicate offenses that fall within the ambit of the 
CCE. Id. at 946 n.6; see supra note 30. 
During congressional debate over the CCE, Representative Taft referred to the CCE's 
"purview." 116 CONGo REc. 33,630-31 (1970). This reference acknowledged that the stat­
ute was created for the limited purpose of punishing the "kingpins" of the drug ring hierar­
chies and not their "lieutenants and foot soldiers." See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 
773, 781 (1985) (discussing the legislative history of the CCE); see supra note 21 and ac­
companying text. 
147. Canino, 949 F.2d at 947. 
148. Id. at 947-48. 
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uing series" element, and reasoned that there should be consistency in 
the way the CCE is applied. 149 The court noted that the purpose of 
the CCE is to punish a defendant whom the jury finds to have partici­
pated in a connected series of narcotics activities with sufficient fre­
quency,lso As a result, the court concluded that, in a CCE case, the 
purpose of the statute is fulfilled when each member of the jury finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant committed at least two 
predicate acts. lSI The jury need not specifically agree upon which two 
violations the defendant committed. IS2 
Juror divergence on the underlying predicate acts that constitute 
a "continuing series" under the CCE raises a question of how far the 
jury must go in agreeing upon particular facts. Although the Canino 
and Echeverri courts characterized the question in terms of unanimity 
under the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
problem of juror divergence on certain factual issues under the re­
quirements of due process. IS3 An analysis of due process, therefore, 
will be helpful in resolving the problem of juror non-concurrence and 
how it should be treated with respect to the CCE. 
III. ANALYSIS 
In federal criminal trials, a defendant's constitutional right to a 
unanimous jury verdict is well established. I S4 In a CCE case, this 
149. Id. The court declined "to adopt a chaotic rule which requires the jury to make 
a unanimous finding with respect to some factual issues (predicate acts) and be relieved of 
such a requirement in relation to findings of other factual issues ('five or more other per­
sons')." Id. at 948. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. See supra note 31 for a discussion of the split among the circuits as to 
whether a continuing series is established by the commission of two or three predicate acts. 
152. Id. at 946. 
153. Schad v. Arizona, III S. Ct. 2491 (1991); see supra notes 57-58 and accompany­
ing text. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 
(5th Cir. 1977), highlighted the existence of a constitutional problem when a court allows 
juror divergence on the factual elements of a crime. The court was the first circuit court to 
reverse a conviction based on the likelihood of juror disparity on the underlying factual 
elements constituting the crime. Id. at 459. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the trial 
court's instruction, which permitted jurors to convict without reaching agreement as to 
what crime had occurred, was in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial and his procedural right to a unanimous verdict under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 31(a). Id. at 456. The Gipson decision triggered a number of criminal appeals, 
two of which are represented by United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988), 
and United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991). As is evidenced by the conflict­
ing holdings of these two cases, the issue of factual juror concurrence remains controver­
sial. The Gipson court did not provide much guidance in resolving the problem. 
154. See supra note 55. 
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right is satisfied when all of the jurors agree that the defendant oper­
ated a continuing criminal enterprise. Beneath this general verdict of 
guilt, however, lies a question regarding whether the jury must also 
agree upon the factual components or predicate acts that gave rise to 
such a verdict. The Supreme Court has recognized that jurors may 
convict a defendant without coming to a unanimous agreement on the 
specific mitigating circumstances surrounding the defendant's acts. ISS 
However, the Court does require some juror specificity regarding the 
defendant's conduct. IS6 A significant area of constitutional inquiry ex­
ists between these two vague borders.ls7 The problem of juror agree­
ment on predicate acts of the "continuing series" element of the CCE 
is a small piece of an expansive constitutional problem that was not 
addressed by either the Echeverri IS8 court or the Canino IS9 court. 
Neither Echeverri nor Canino characterized the juror divergence 
problem as one of due process, as the Supreme Court required in 
Schad v. Arizona. Echeverri was decided well before Schad, but 
Canino was decided shortly afterwards. Despite this timing, Canino 
identified the question ofjuror agreement on the CCE predicate acts as 
one of Sixth Amendment unanimity and did not recognize the due 
process concem. l60 Nevertheless, after Schad, the question of juror 
agreement or divergence on the underlying factual elements of a crime 
155. See. e.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990). The defendant was 
convicted of first-degree murder and the Court held that North Carolina's unanimity re­
quirement impermissibly limited the jurors consideration of mitigating evidence to reverse 
the defendant's conviction and death sentence. Id. at 435. In his concurring opinion, Jus­
tice Blackmun commented that different jurors might come to the same bottom-line con­
clusion on the basis of different pieces of evidence. Id. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
He stated that "[p]lainly there is no general requirement that the jury reach agreement on 
the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict." Id. 
156. See. e.g., Schad, III S. Ct. at 2497-98 (1991). The plurality opinion in Schad 
recognized that the jury must reach agreement that the defendant committed a particular 
crime. The Court indicated that, "nothing in our history suggests that the Due Process 
Clause would permit a State to convict anyone under a charge of 'Crime' so generic that 
any combination of jury findings of embezzlement, reckless driving, murder, burglary, tax 
evasion, or littering, for example, would suffice for conviction." Id. 
157. See Scott W. Howe, Jury Fact-Finding in Criminal Cases: Constitutional Limits 
on Factual Disagreements Among Convicting Jurors, 58 Mo. L. REV. I (1993), for a thor­
ough discussion of this constitutional problem. 
158. United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988). 
159. United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
1940 (1992). 
160. Id. at 946 n.5. The only indication of any concern over the requirements of due 
process in the Canino opinion occurred in the court's concluding remarks on the issue of 
juror unanimity when it stated that "[t]he constitutional requirement of juror unanimity in 
federal criminal offenses is satisfied when each juror in a CCE trial is convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a defendant charged under the CCE statute committed two predicate 
offenses." Id. at 948 (emphasis added). The court failed to discuss, however, whether such 
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must be resolved in terms of a due process analysis. 161 
A. Due Process Background 
It has long been assumed that proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
on a criminal charge is constitutionally required for conviction. 162 
The Supreme Court, in In re Winship,163 stated that the requirement 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is "basic in our law and rightly 
one of the boasts of a free society ... and a safeguard of due process of 
law in the historic, procedural content of 'due process.' "164 The rea­
sonable doubt standard is a vital tool in reducing the risk of convic­
tions based on factual error. 16S It provides a material foundation for 
the presumption of innocence, which lies at the heart of our criminal 
justice system. 166 
In his opinion for the Winship Court, Justice Brennan advocated 
giving the accused the outcome advantage. 167 To accomplish this end, 
a reasonable doubt is raised when jurors disagree on the factual basis constituting a "con­
tinuing series" under the statute. 
The reasonable doubt language in the Canino opinion is likely to arise from the fact 
that the unanimity required by the Sixth Amendment serves to effectuate the reasonable 
doubt standard. See Note, Right to Jury Unanimity on Material Fact Issues: United States 
v. Gipson, 91 HARV. L. REV. 499, 501 (1977) (discussing the Gipson decision and agreeing 
with the court's holding that the Sixth Amendment requires conviction by a jury in a fed­
eral case to be based upon juror agreement on a specific act along with a general consensus 
on the defendant's guilt) [hereinafter Note, Right to Jury Unanimity]. 
161. The relevant language of the Fifth Amendment states as follows: "No person 
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime ... nor shall any person 
... be depriVed of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U:S. CONST. 
amend. V. 
While the first place of inquiry would normally be with the statute itself, the language 
of the CCE provides no guidance regarding the extent to which a jury must agree upon the 
factual predicate act requirements of the "continuing series" element. In addition, the leg­
islative history provides no direction on the issue. See supra note 146. Consequently, one 
must turn to the Constitution to resolve the problem regarding upon what a jury is required 
to agree in federal criminal trials. 
162. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970). 
163. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
164. Id. at 362 (quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting». 
165. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363. 
166. Id. at 363. 
167. Id. The opinion noted, 
"There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, 
which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an 
interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin 
of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the 
burden of ... persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Id. at 364 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958». 
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the burden of proof is allocated to the prosecutor in cases where the 
accused has something of transcending value at stake. 168 The concept 
of due process has at its foundation a concern for protection of the 
innocent from wrongful condemnation. 169 Justice Harlan, in his con­
curring opinion in Winship, noted that in a criminal case, the due pro­
cess requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is "bottomed on 
a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to 
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."17o 
The constitutional mandate of the "proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard in criminal cases l7 • reveals the Court's recognition of 
the necessity of factual concurrence among convicting jurors. The 
Court stated that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused 
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged."I72 The Court did not comment, however, on the level of 
factual specificity that convicting jurors must reach. 173 
1. Facts that Require Juror Agreement 
In an attempt to define a line of demarcation between factual is­
sues upon which a jury must agree and those upon which a jury need 
not agree, the courts use a standard of materiality.174 The dividing 
line between "material" fact issues, on which the jury must reach 
agreement, and more specific "immaterial" issues, is not always 
c1ear.175 
The courts have suggested different methods of determining when 
a factual issue is sufficiently material to require specific juror agree­
ment. 176 Most courts hold that a viable jury non-concurrence claim 
168. Id. at 363. 
169. Id. at 374 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
170. Id. at 372. 
171. Id. at 362. 
172. Id. at 364 (emphasis added). 
173. Although the Winship Court did not clearly articulate which cases require juror 
agreement on the factual issues underlying a given offense, one commentator has suggested 
a factual concurrence mandate which would restrict divergence among convicting jurors as 
a safeguard against erroneous convictions. Howe, supra note 157, at 7-16. Professor Howe 
suggests that in situations where there is a potential for jurors to disagree over the factual 
basis for a guilty verdict, "jurors ought to be required to agree upon at least one of the 
factual alternatives before finding the defendant guilty." Id. at 82. 
174. United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Lennon, 
246 F.2d 24,27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 836 (1957) (recognizing the physical filing 
of a false tax return as the most specific material "act" upon which the jury was required to 
unanimously agree); see also Note, Right to Jury Unanimity, supra note 160, at 501. 
175. See Note, Right to Jury Unanimity, supra note 160, at 501. 
176. See Howe, supra note 157, at 21-47. Professor Howe's article analyzed the 
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only arises when a single criminal charge involves two or more distinct 
and separate crimes. 177 Thus, a convicted defendant may only appeal 
based on a claim that the jury's verdict was defective because of non­
concurrence when the indictment had alleged two or more distinct 
criminal acts. In this respect, the CCE would give rise to a viable 
juror divergence claim because the statute requires commission of at 
least two178 drug-related felonies to constitute the "continuing series" 
element of a CCE offense. 179 Thus, under the distinct-crimes stan­
dard, the jury in a CCE case should not be permitted to arrive at a 
general verdict of guilt or innocence when they disagree as to which of 
the defendant's acts constituted a "continuing series" under the 
statute. 
Some courts, however, frequently employ the distinct-crimes 
standard to reject factual divergence claims. ISO These courts reason 
judicial approaches to materiality, criticized them, and provided a resolution based on 
"careful analysis of the evidentiary context in each case." Id. at 42,46. This more sensible 
approach to determining which facts require jury agreement is to proceed on a case-by-case 
basis, focusing on the avoidance of juror confusion. In fact, the Ninth Circuit has recently 
identified a number of situations that might necessitate specific juror unanimity. Jeffries v. 
Blodgett, 974 F.2d 1179, 1192 (9th Cir. 1992) (addressing a Washington aggravated first­
degree murder statute and concluding that the jury was not required to specify mitigating 
factors and the corresponding weight that it assigned to them). In Jeffries, the court stated 
that general juror unanimity was not sufficient when the nature of the evidence presented 
was complex, when there was a discrepancy between the evidence and the indictment, or 
when some other factor was present to create a genuine possibility of juror confusion. Id. 
177. See. e.g., Cook v. State, 741 S.W.2d 928, 934-36 (Tex. 1987) (holding that the 
jury did not have to agree on the type of felony that supported a felony-murder conviction), 
vacated on other grounds, 488 U.S. 807 (1988); State v. Franco, 639 P.2d 1320, 1323-24 
(Wash. 1982) (recognizing that convicting jurors were not required to agree on alternative 
methods of violation specified in a statute that addressed driving while under the influence 
of drugs or alcohol); People v. Sullivan, 65 N.E. 989, 996 (N.Y. 1903) (concluding that 
convicting jurors were not required to agree on a theory of premeditation or of felony­
murder in finding the defendant guilty of first-degree murder). See generally Mark A. 
Gelowitz, Note, Jury Unanimity on Questions ofMaterial Fact: When Six and Six Do Not 
Equal Twelve, 12 QUEENS L. J. 66 (1987). See also Howe, supra note 157, at 26-35. 
In Walsh v. United States, 174 F. 615 (7th Cir. 1909), cert. denied, 215 U.S. 609 
(1910), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a jury verdict will not be 
upset based on inconsistency where the potential for juror nonconcurrence "is in respect to 
immaterial particulars concerning the means by which the crime was committed." Id. at 
620. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112 
(3d Cir. 1975), recognized the "separate crimes" standard for materiality. Id. at 117 n.9, 
117-18. 
178. See supra note 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the present conflict 
among the circuits as to whether a "continuing series" under the CCE statute means two or 
three drug-related felonies. 
179. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2) (1988); see supra note 20. 
180. Some courts have held that juries may convict the defendant of a crime without 
agreeing whether the defendant was a principal or an accessory to the offense. See, e.g., 
State v. Wixon, 631 P.2d 1033 (Wash. App. 1981); Holland v. State, 280 N.W.2d 288 (Wis. 
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that the separate acts which are prohibited by a single statute are 
merely different ways of committing a single crime. Several courts 
have held that when the crime was of a "continuous" nature, and thus 
still "single," the jury need not concur as to which of the defendant's 
alleged multiple acts constituted the charged offense. 181 These courts 
often defer to the legislative history of the statute involved to establish 
that the lawmakers intended to create a single offense.l 82 One court 
stated that, "[o]nly if the statute describes several separate and distinct 
offenses must there be a unanimous verdict as to each separate crime 
described." 183 Indeed, if the Seventh Circuit in Canino 184 had ad­
dressed the juror factual divergence problem in more depth, it is possi­
ble that the court would have taken this position and deferred to the 
legislative history of the CCE. The court might have viewed the CCE 
as describing a single offense in the abstract, emphasizing the fact that 
the predicate acts required by this provision are continuous in nature 
and really only amount to a single crime. 
As an alternative to the distinct-crimes test, several courts have 
taken an approach which focuses on whether the evidence under a 
single charge discloses distinct acts which could each give rise to cul­
pability.l8s Under this approach, courts focus on the defendant's al­
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931 (1980). In addition, courts have concluded that jurors 
need not agree on the underlying acts that establish a conspiracy to convict the defendant. 
See, e.g., United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1202 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 
U.S. 949 (1982). 
181. See, e.g., Gray v. United States, 544 A.2d 1255 (D.C. App. 1988) (concluding 
that convicting jurors do not have to agree on which two acts of intercourse formed the 
basis to convict the defendant of rape charges despite the fact that the acts occurred several 
minutes apart and were separated by an interruption arising from the approach of strangers 
and an alleged act of oral sodomy). ct. Jeffries v. Blodgett, 974 F.2d 1179, 1192 (9th Cir. 
1992) (finding that a "crime" or a "scheme" were merely alternative ways of committing 
aggregated first-degree murder and thus a specific crime was not an element of aggravating 
circumstance under the Washington statute); United States v. Sasser, 971 F.2d 470, 478 
(10th Cir. 1992) (holding that the falsity of earnest money deposits and down payments 
were "intimately intertwined" and "not conceptually distinct acts," thus the district court's 
refusal to give a specific unanimity instruction was not an abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 
113 S. Ct. 1292 (1993); United States v. Ferris, 719 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that 
the trial court was not required to instruct the jury that they must be in unanimous agree­
ment on which of several instances of LSD possession formed the basis for a guilty verdict 
on drug-possession charges). 
182. State v. Franco, 639 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Wash. 1982). 
183. Id.; see also State v. Arndt, 553 P.2d 1328 (Wash. 1976). 
184. United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
1940 (1992). 
185. See Scarborough v. United States, 522 A.2d 869, 873 (D.C. App. 1987) (en 
banc) (holding that the juror nonconcurrence issue should depend on whether "each act" 
alleged under a single count could be conceived separately). The distinct-acts test is a 
modification of a distinct-incidents test which focused on whether the evidence reveals dis­
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leged acts rather than on the specific crime or crimes charged and 
recognize the possibility of requiring specific juror agreement as to 
such acts. 186 
This standard would seem to apply effectively to the CCE juror 
agreement problem. The predicate acts that comprise a "continuing 
series" are separate acts, in the sense that each is a drug-related fel­
ony.187 Although each predicate act could not separately give rise to a 
continuing criminal enterprise, a combination cjf any two or threel88 of 
those acts may provide the basis for CCE culpability. Under the dis­
tinct-acts test, therefore, juror agreement in cases involving the CCE 
statute should be specific with respect to the predicate acts that com­
prise a "continuing series of violations." 
One commentator has suggested that this case-by-case analysis 
should be composed of two steps.189 First, the court should consider 
whether the evidence under a single charge establishes divisible bases 
for determining the defendant's guilt and, second, the court must de­
cide when juror divergence on these different bases would undermine 
the decision that the defendant had committed the charged offense. l90 
In a CCE case, the government must present evidence to support 
its allegation that the defendant committed at least two drug-related 
felonies. 191 These acts must be separate and distinct in order to satisfy 
the "continuing series" requirement of the statute. 192 Allowing jurors 
to convict a defendant charged with a CCE offense without specifying 
upon which acts they relied to find a "continuing series" under the 
statute would permit conviction even when half of the jurors believed 
the defendant committed two particular drug-related felonies, while 
the remaining six jurors relied on two completely different felonies. 
tinct "incidents" that establish the defendant's guilt on a single count. See Howe, supra 
note 157, at 38; see also Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1335 (D.C. App. 
1985) (recognizing that factual juror nonconcurrence is a viable claim when "one charge in 
the indictment encompasses two separate incidents"), cm. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 (1988). 
For commentary supporting the distinct-acts test as the superior measure, see Howe, supra 
note 157, at 38. Professor Howe commented that the distinct-acts test was "more appropri­
ate than the distinct-incidents test because it can identify more true factual nonconcurrence 
problems." [d. 
186. Scarborough, 522 A.2d at 873; Derrington, 488 A.2d at 1335. 
187. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(I) (1988); see supra note 20. 
188. See supra note 31 for a discussion of the conflict among the circuits as to 
whether the CCE "continuing series" requires two or three predicate narcotics violations. 
189. Howe, supra note 157, at 35-36. 
190. [d. at 36. 
191. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(I); see supra note 20. 
192. § 848(c)(2); see supra note 20. 
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Such a result, which the Seventh Circuit's decision in Canino 193 would 
seem to permit, raises a substantial doubt as to what acts, if any, the 
defendant committed. Under due process, this doubt would bar a con­
viction for any of the acts individually on constitutional grounds. 194 
In some instances, juror agreement on the predicate acts that es­
tablish a continuing series would not present a problem. For instance, 
if only two drug-related felonies were alleged,195 a convicting jury 
could have relied only on those two alleged acts. In other cases, how­
ever, such as Canino 196 and Echeverri,197 where the government al­
leged a number of drug violations,198 the issue of juror factual 
concurrence becomes problematic. Some factual concurrence on the 
predicate acts that constitute a continuing series under the CCE must 
be required in order to protect the defendant's due process rights. 199 
This conclusion arises from the fact that the continuing series provi­
sion is an element of the offense2°O and the acts which comprise the 
continuing series are separate felonies. Substantial juror divergence on 
those underlying felonies raises doubt as to whether the defendant ac­
tually committed the necessary number of predicate offenses required 
by the CCE. 
2. Number of Jurors that Must Agree 
If due process requires some juror agreement as to which of the 
CCE predicate acts the defendant committed, the next question is, 
how many jurors must agree that the defendant committed a particu­
lar series of acts in order to satisfy the due process standard? The 
answer to this question depends upon how much juror divergence 
raises a "reasonable doubt" concerning the defendant's guilt or inno­
193. United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
1940 (1992). 
194. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) (recognizing that due process in a 
criminal case requires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt prior to conviction); see 
supra notes 162-73 and accompanying text. 
195. Two felonies would support a CCE conviction in a jurisdiction that interprets a 
CCE continuing series to be two or more drug-related felonies as opposed to three or more. 
See supra note 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dispute among the circuits 
as to whether a "continuing series" means two or three drug-related felonies. 
196. 949 F.2d at 928. 
197. United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988). 
198. See Canino, 949 F.2d at 933 (the indictment specified five different drug-related 
transactions); Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 639 (the defendant was charged with five drug-related 
acts). 
199. See supra note 162 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme 
Court's due process standard. 
200. See supra note 77. 
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cence on a particular charge. The Supreme Court has indicated that 
in non-capital cases with a twelve-person jury, due process requires 
less than complete unanimity,201 but something more than a simple 
majority.202 
In Johnson v. Louisiana,203 the Court indicated that a "substan­
tial majority" of the jurors must be in agreement on the defendant's 
guilt in order to convict.204 In Johnson, the defendant was convicted 
by a nine to three verdict and the Court decided that the lack of abso­
lute jury unanimity did not violate due process of law.205 In a concur­
ring opinion, Justice Blackmun suggested that he would have difficulty 
convicting a defendant where less than three-quarters of the jurors 
agreed.206 
In a CCE case, due process requires that a substantial majority of 
the jurors specifically agree on which predicate acts the defendant 
committed to constitute a continuing series under the statute. Because 
of the potential for harsh minimum sentencing penalties under the 
201. The Supreme Court has left open the possibility that juror unanimity on the 
facts that underlie the defendant's conviction might be required in capital cases. Johnson v. 
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 356 (1972) (noting that the state required a unanimous jury ver­
dict in capital cases); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (recognizing that in no 
state can a defendant be sentenced to death by less than 12 jurors); Burch v. Louisiana, 441 
U.S. 130, 131 n.l, 138-39 (1979) (requiring unanimity of a six-person jury to convict the 
defendant ofa non-petty offense); accord Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 n.1 (1972) 
(recognizing an Oregon statute that required jury unanimity in cases of first-degree mur­
der). Support for this heightened level of juror agreement rests on the fact that a conviction 
in such cases results in the defendant's death. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 
(1980) (stating that the death penalty is significantly different from other punishments and 
consequently, heightened reliability of the jury's verdict of guilt in capital cases is required); 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (recognizing "qualitative dif­
ference between death and other penalties" which necessitates increased reliability when 
the defendant is sentenced to death). 
202. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 356 (upholding the constitutionality of a state law allowing 
less than unanimous guilty verdicts in non-capital cases when at least 9 of 12 jurors agreed); 
Burch, 441 U.S. at 130 (holding that where a six person jury is empaneled in a nsm-capital 
trial, a conviction required juror unanimity of the defendant's guilt); Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 
404 (upholding the constitutionality of a state law allowing less than unanimous guilty 
verdicts in non-capital cases when at least 10 jurors agreed). 
203. 406 U.S. at 356. 
204. Id. at 362. 
205. Id. at 363. 
206. Id. at 366 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun was not as clear, how­
ever, on where he would draw the line of juror agreement: 
I do not hesitate to say, either, that a system employing a 7-5 standard, rather 
than a 9-3 or 75% minimum, would afford me great difficulty. As Mr. Justice 
White points out, ... 'a substantial majority of the jury' are to be convinced. 
That is all that is before us in each of these cases. 
Id. 
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CCE,207 including the possibility of a death penalty,20B a substantial 
majority in such cases should be at least three-quarters of the jury. 209 
Anything less would create a reasonable doubt that would render a 
guilty verdict unconstitutional under the Court's standard of due 
process. 
B. 	 The Supreme Court's Attempt to Deal With the Problem of 
Juror Divergence on Factual Issues 
The Supreme Court recently confronted the constitutional aspects 
of a factual juror nonconcurrence claim in Schad v. Arizona.210 The 
Court's decision in Schad was its first attempt in this century to ad­
dress this problem.2l1 The case involved an Arizona statute which 
defined three ways of committing the offense of first degree murder, 
and the Court concluded that the jury was not required to agree upon 
which theory they found the defendant guilty.212 
In Schad, the defendant, Edward Schad, had been convicted of 
violating an Arizona statute213 which specified that the crime of first 
degree murder encompassed any murder that fell within one of three 
general categories.214 The statute defined the crime of first degree 
207. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988) (requiring a minimum sentence of 20 years); id. 
§ 848(b) (providing certain conditions for life imprisonment); see supra notes 23-25 and 
accompanying text. 
208. 21 U.S.c. § 848(e) (providing certain conditions for death penalty). There is an 
argument to be made that CCE cases should also leave open the possibility of absolute juror 
unanimity on the underlying predicate acts that constitute a continuing series under the 
statute. See supra note 201 and accompanying text for a discussion of unanimity in capital 
cases. 
209. See supra note 206 and accompanying text for a supporting view of Justice 
Blackmun, with reference to general gUilty verdicts. 
210. 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991). 
211. Two Supreme Court cases presented similar juror nonconcurrence claims in the 
late 19th century. See Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481 (1898); St. Clair v. United 
States, 154 U.S. 134 (1894). In St. Clair, the Court did not directly address the defendant's 
claim that the indictment was duplicitous and simply declared that the indictment was 
proper. St. Clair, 154 U.S. at 146. Similarly, the Andersen Court did not definitively ad­
dress the factual nonconcurrence aspect of the defendant's duplicity claim, but the Court 
did reject his claim that the indictment was invalid. Andersen, 170 U.S. at 503-04. C/. 
Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 636 (1896) (recognizing that the alternative ways of 
committing fraud, which were listed in the statute, could be alleged in one count), overruled 
by Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642 (1914). 
212. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2503-04. 
213. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-452 (West Supp. 1973) (repealed 1978). 
214. [d. The statute provided as follows: 
A murder which is perpetrated by means of poison or lying in wait, torture or by 
any other kind of wilful, deliberate or premeditated killing, or which is committed 
in avoiding or preventing lawful arrest or effecting an escape from legal custody, 
or in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape in the first degree, 
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murder as murder that was either (1) wilful or premeditated, (2) com­
mitted in an attempt to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or in substanti­
ating an escape, or (3) committed during specified felonies. 21s The 
prosecution submitted that Schad was guilty of premeditated and fel­
ony murder216 and the trial court charged the jury on both theories 
without any requirement that they agree upon which type of murder 
Schad had committed.217 The jury returned a guilty verdict and 
Schad was sentenced to death.218 
Although Schad had not requested separate verdicts, he claimed 
on appeal that the trial judge erred in failing to require the jury to 
issue separate verdicts on the two alleged theories of first degree mur­
der.219 The Supreme Court rejected his claim and concluded that pre­
meditated murder and felony murder were merely two methods of 
committing a single crime.220 Therefore, the Court held that the con­
victing jurors were not required to agree on the particular theory of 
first degree murder. 221 
A divided United States Supreme Court noted that the potential 
for juror disagreement on the different bases of culpability under the 
statute should be evaluated under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, and not the Sixth Amendment.222 All of the Justices 
indicated that factual disagreement among jurors would violate the 
Constitution in some instances,223 but none of them provided clear 
answers regarding when and why such situations would arise to re­
quire that trial courts demand specific juror agreement on certain fac­
tual elements. 
robbery, burglary, kidnapping or mayhem or sexual molestation of a child under 
the age of thirteen years, is murder of the first degree. All other kinds of murder 
are of the second degree. 
Id.; see Schad, III S. Ct. at 2495 n.1. 
215. § 13-452. 
216. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2495. 
217. Id. The judge instructed the jury: "[a]1l12 of you must agree on a verdict. All 
12 of you must agree whether the verdict is guilty or not guilty." Id. 
218. Id. at 2495. 
219. Id. at 2495-96. 
220. Id. at 2496 . 
. 221. [d. Thus, the Court seemed to take the single crime approach to the Arizona 
statute. See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text for a dlscussion of the single crime 
approach to the requirement of juror agreement. 
222. [d. at 2498 n.5. In Schad, Justice Souter wrote for a plurality of four. [d. at 
2493. Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurring opinion. [d. at 2505 (Scalia, J., concur­
ring). Finally, Justice White wrote the dissenting opinion for the remaining four justices. 
[d. at 2507 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.). 
223. See infra note 226 for Justice Scalia's comment regarding when juror divergence 
on factual issues would not be permissible. 
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Five Justices concluded that the Constitution does not require ju­
rors to agree on which theory, premeditated or felony murder, the de­
fendant was guilty as long as the State had declared that these theories 
were merely two ways of committing a single crime.224 The Court 
indicated that the requirement of factual juror agreement would only 
apply to the "elements" of a crime.225 One of these five Justices, Jus­
tice Scalia, did not join the plurality opinion because he disagreed with 
the deference it gave to a state's definition of what constitutes a single 
crime.226 The dissenting opinion, written by Justice White, concluded 
that juror agreement on the alternative theories of first degree murder 
was always required for a conviction to be constitutional.227 
The plurality, in an opinion written by Justice Souter, concluded 
that a general unanimity instruction was sufficient for two reasons. 
First, the Court found that the distinct requisite mental states required 
under the state statute228 reflected equal notions of blameworthiness 
and that Arizona had indicated, through repeated supreme court deci­
sions,229 that premeditated murder and felony murder were not sepa­
rate crimes, but two ways of committing a single crime.230 Second, the 
statute's approach of equating two mental states, either of which 
would satisfy the crime of first degree murder, was historically recog­
nized.231 Justice Souter went no further in articulating the basis for a 
conclusion that the Arizona practice was constitutional. He indicated, 
however, that where a single offense could be committed by alternate 
modes that appeared to involve different degrees of culpability, the 
224. Schad, III S. Ct. at 2496. Justice Souter, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy came to this conclusion. 
225. Id. at 2499-500. See supra note 77 for a discussion of "continuing series" provi­
sion of the CCE as an element of that offense. 
226. Id. at 2505 (Scalia, J., concurring). In addition, Justice Scalia pointed out, "We 
would not permit, for example, an indictment charging that the defendant assaulted either 
X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday." [d. at 2507. 
227. [d. at 2507 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, 
JJ.). 
228. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-452 (West Supp. 1973) (repealed 1978); see supra 
note 214. 
229. See State v. Schad, 788 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Ariz. 1989); State v. Encinas, 647 P.2d 
624 (Ariz. 1982). 
230. Schad, III S. Ct. at 2498; see also Schad, 788 P.2d at 1168 (indicating that 
premeditated murder and felony murder were two ways of committing a single crime); 
Encinas, 647 P.2d at 627 (declining to require an instruction that jurors in a first-degree 
murder case must agree as between premeditated and felony-murder theories). 
231. Schad, III S. Ct. at 2502. Justice Souter concluded that "[a]merican jurisdic­
tions have modified the common law by legislation classifying murder by degrees, the re­
sulting statutes have in most cases retained premeditated murder and some form of felony 
murder ... as alternative means of satisfying the mental state that first-degree murder 
presupposes." Id. 
1993] CRIMINAL LAW-UNITED STATES v. CANINO 301 
Constitution might necessitate treatment of those modes of conduct as 
separate crimes.232 In addition, Justice Souter noted that other factors 
might be relevant to the question, but he did not explain what those 
factors were.233 
For the dissent, Justice White concluded that the due process 
principles of Winship 234 required that the prosecution prove and the 
jury agree on the facts necessary to constitute the crime at issue "be­
yond a reasonable doubt. "235 The dissent reasoned that the possibility 
of juror divergence on the mens rea elements of first degree murder 
under the Arizona statute created a reasonable doubt which would 
make the conviction unconstitutional under due process standards.236 
Justice White seemed to adopt a "separate-crime" criteria for deter­
mining when materially different bases of cUlpability are present.237 
The state statute at issue in Schad involved a single act, first de­
gree murder, that could have been achieved by one of three criminal 
means. It can be distinguished from cases involving multiple of­
fenses. 238 The Fifth Circuit has recognized, in a case involving various 
perjury violations, that the circumstances in Schad differ "from the 
situation where a single count as submitted to the jury embraces two 
or more separate offenses, though each be a violation of the same stat­
ute. "239 Commission of a CCE involves at least two or three violative 
acts,24O each of which is a drug-related crime.241 The Schad Court did 
232. Id. at 2503. 
233. 	 Id. at 2504. Justice Souter stated, 
We would not warrant that these considerations exhaust the universe of 
those potentially relevant to judgments about the legitimacy of defining certain 
facts as mere means to the commission of one offense. But they do suffice to 
persuade us that the jury's options in this case did not faIl beyond the constitu­
tional bounds of fundamental fairness and rationality. 
Id. 
234. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
235. Schad, III S. Ct. at 2508 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 
364). 
236. Id. at 2509. 
237. Id. at 2510. Justice White presented a hypothetical that demonstrated an im­
material fact that would not require juror agreement. He stated that a factual issue in the 
case of a burglary where there was a dispute as to whether the defendant pried a window 
open with a screwdriver or a crowbar would be immaterial. Id. See supra notes 177-83 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinct-crimes theory as it relates to the 
juror nonconcurrence problem. 
238. The Schad plurality expressly limited its decision to the facts of the case before 
it. Schad, III S. Ct. at 2504. Indeed, Justice Scalia, emphasized this point in his Schad 
concurrence. Id. at 2507 (Scalia, J., concurring); see supra note 226. 
239. United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 927 (5th Cir. 1991). 
240. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2) (1988); see supra note 20. 
241. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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not clearly define what circumstances would necessitate specific juror 
agreement, but indicated that such agreement would be required with 
respect to "independent elements" of a crime.242 
The Schad Court determined that the alternative ways of com­
mitting first degree murder under the Arizona statute were not ele­
ments of that offense, however, in a CCE case, the "continuing series" 
provision constitutes an independent element of the CCE.243 
C. 	 Due Process Requirements ofJuror Unanimity on the 
Continuing Series Element of the CCE 
Due process guarantees the defendant the right to a conviction 
based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 244 When the jurors in a 
CCE case cannot agree upon which acts the defendant has committed, 
not only does the verdict lack proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to 
each of the predicate offenses individually, but there is also a reason­
able doubt as to the CCE violation as a whole. If six jurors are con­
vinced that the defendant committed predicate crimes "A," "B," and 
"C," and six are convinced that the defendant committed predicate 
crimes "D," "E," and "F," there is not a clear consensus that the 
defendant committed any of the predicate crimes because only half of 
the jurors agree that the defendant committed any individual of­
fense. 245 Based on the Winship standard of due process,246 this type of 
juror divergence on the CCE predicate acts raises a reasonable doubt 
as to whether the defendant actually engaged in a continuing crimi­
nal enterprise. A conviction under such circumstances, which the 
Canino 247 decision would seem to permit, would be contrary to the 
Court's established standard of due process.248 
In a CCE case, the jury should be instructed that they must agree, 
by a substantial majority, on which of the defendant's alleged acts they 
relied to find a "continuing series" under the statute. Furthermore, 
242. 	 Schad, III S. Ct. at 2499. 
243. 	 See supra note 77. 
244. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970); see supra notes 162-73 and accompa­
nying text. 
245. The Schad facts present a different situation. In Schad, if six jurors were con­
vinced that Schad had committed premeditated murder and six .were convinced that he had 
committed felony murder, all of the jurors would still be in unanimous agreement that the 
defendant had committed the act of murder. The Court's opinion would seem to indicate 
that such a scenario would not be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt for purposes of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Schad: III S. Ct. at 2503-04. 
246. 	 Winship, 397 U.S. at 359-64. 
247. United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
1940 (1992). 
248. 	 See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
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the harsh sentencing proVisions of the CCE,249 including certain con­
ditions for the death penalty,250 prompt the conclusion that no less 
than three-quarters of the jury must agree on the defendant's predicate 
acts.2S1 
While the Schad Court did not require specific juror agreement 
on the mens rea provisions of an Arizona first degree murder stat­
ute,252 the Court did indicate that such agreement would be required 
on the elements of a crime.253 The "continuing series" provision of the 
CCE was intended as an element of the overall CCE offense.254 More­
over, while the defendant in Schad was convicted of only one criminal 
act that he could have committed in a number of ways, in CCE cases, 
the government presents a number of separate acts to the jury. Even if 
the jury in Schad disagreed as to the manner in which the crime of 
first degree murder occurred, there would still be proof beyond a rea­
sonable doubt that a murder was committed. Conversely, in a case 
involving the CCE, if the jury disagreed as to the predicate acts the 
defendant had committed, there would be a reasonable doubt as to 
whether a "continuing series" of violations existed at all. The mens 
rea alternate ways of committing first degree murder under the Ari­
zona statute must be distinguished from the predicate crimes required 
for a conviction of a CCE offense, as the latter represent distinct crimi­
nal acts which form the basis for CCE conviction. 
The Supreme Court's attempt to address juror divergence on fac­
tual issues did not go far enough to delineate when specific agreement 
among jurors should be required. Cases involving the CCE represent 
a situation where a substantial majority of the jurors should be re­
quired to agree on the predicate act violations which constitute a "con­
tinuing series" under· the statute. In order to address the practical 
problem of assuring that the necessary agreement exists in a particular 
case, it may be helpful to compare the use of special verdicts in the 
courts to assure juror agreement in cases involving a complex statu­
249. 21 U.S.c. § 848(a) (1988). 
250. Id. § 848(e). 
251. See supra note 206 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Black­
mun's concurrence in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366 (1972) (Blackmun, J., con­
curring), concluding that the defendant's due process rights would be violated by allowing 
a jury to convict when less than three-quarters of the jurors are convinced. 
252. See supra text accompanying note 215. 
253. Schad v. Arizona, III S. Ct. 2491, 2499-500 (1991). 
254. See supra note 77. The dissent in Schad would most likely categorize the predi­
cate acts that constitute a CCE "continuing series" as separate crimes, deserving of specific 
juror agreement. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2510 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.). 
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tory crime, similar in structure to the CCE-the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").2ss 
D. Comparison of the CCE with RICO 
Like the CCE provision of the Controlled Substances Act,2S6 
RICO describes a complex statutory crime. Both statutes respond to 
the special dangers and problems involved with organized crime, and 
both attempt to counteract the growing influence of organized crime 
over the nation's economic and political bodies.2s7 While the CCE is 
specifically targeted at the organizers and supervisors of large drug 
rings,2S8 RICO takes aim at all organized crime.2S9 Under RICO, it is 
unlawful for any individual to be part of an "enterprise"260 "through a 
pattern of racketeering activity."261 The RICO statute does not ex­
pressly define "pattern of racketeering activity," and the meaning of 
this element currently represents one of the most controversial issues 
of interpretation arising under RICO.262 However, the term "pattern" 
255. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 
§ 901, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988». 
256. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1265 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988». 
257. See, e.g., Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement ofFindings and Pur­
pose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922,922-23 (1970). 
258. 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (1988); see supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
259. Various courts have recognized that the purpose of RICO is to eradicate cor­
ruption caused by organized crime. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 
(1985) (recognizing that in enacting RICO Congress intended to reach both "legitimate" 
and "illegitimate" enterprises); United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386, 393 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(concluding that Congress meant to define the wrongful conduct that constitutes the predi­
cate acts for a federal racketeering charge in a more generic sense), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 
1019 (1987); United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1198 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that 
RICO was intended to eradicate organized crime rather than to subject average criminals 
to the chapter's increased punishment), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983); United States v. 
Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 33 (2d Cir. 1981) (recognizing that Congress intended RICO to be 
interpreted to apply to activities that corrupt public entities), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 
(1982). 
260. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988). The RICO statute defines "enterprise" as "any 
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or 
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Id. Such an enterprise 
can arise in several forms. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-93 (1981) 
(including both legitimate and illegitimate organizations in the definition of a RICO "enter­
prise"); United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359, 1399 (S.D. N.Y. 1985) (holding that 
the existence of an enterprise may be established if the government proves that a group of 
persons with common goals, collective interests, and an ongoing body of personnel exists). 
261. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988). 
262. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. See Michael Goldsmith, RICO and "Pattern:" [sic] 
The Search for "Continuity Plus Relationship," 73 CORNELL L. REV. 971 (1988); Ethan M. 
Posner, Note, Clarifying a "Pattern" of Co.~fusion: A Multi-factor Approach to Civil 
RICO's Pattern Requirement, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1745, 1748 (1988); Stephen G. Harvey, 
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is defined in the statute and requires at least two predicate acts of 
"racketeering activity" within ten years of one another.263 
The "continuing series" element of the CCE can be equated to the 
"pattern" provision of RICQ264 in that both require the defendant to 
commit a number of illegal acts which constitute the larger offense.26S 
Note, The Pattern Requirement in Civil RICO is Working: Case Law After Sedima, 33 
VILL. L. REV. 205, 209 (1988) (noting extensive split of authority). 
263. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The RICO statute defines "racketeering activity" as 
"predicate acts" including any act or threat in violation of any of eight specified state felo­
nies or 25 specified federal offenses, including any violation punishable under the federal 
mail, wire, and securities fraud statutes. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). 
The Supreme Court has commented on the "pattern" element, stating that the legisla­
tive history of RICO indicates that "two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not consti­
tute a pattern." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985). The Court 
discussed the concept of continuity as the basis for a RICO pattern and held that the 
predicate acts of racketeering activity under RICO must be continuous and related to con­
stitute a "pattern" under the statute. Id. Since Sedima, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that Congress intended that RICO have "a more stringent [pattern] requirement than proof 
simply of two predicates." H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237 
(1989); see also Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22,30 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Racketeer­
ing acts, then, do not constitute a pattern simply because they number two or more."), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988). 
264. See infra note 265 and accompanying text. 
In United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 1988), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit acknowledged the similarity between the RICO and 
CCE charges in its discussion of the CCE. The Echeverri court commented, 
Moreover, with respect to the RICO count, a count analogous to the CCE count in 
question here, the district court gave a careful unanimity instruction regarding 
the predicate acts and issued special verdict forms which required the jury to 
designate the specific predicate acts upon which they had unanimously agreed. 
Id. (emphasis added). The court went on to state that due to the absence of similar specific 
unanimity instructions with respect to the elements constituting a "continuing series" 
under the CCE charge, the jury may have erroneously inferred that such specific unanimity 
on that charge was unnecessary. Id. Had the trial court used a similar instruction regard­
ing the "continuing series" element of the CCE count, unanimity would not have posed the 
problem that it did on appeal. 
265. The relevant portion of the RICO statute states as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise 
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to 
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988) (emphasis added). 
The relevant portion of the CCE statute states as follows: "For purposes of subsection 
(a) of this section, a person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if ... (2) such 
violation is part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter or subchapter II of 
this chapter." 21 U.S.c. § 848(c) (1988) (emphasis added). 
There are, however, differences between the two statutes that might discourage com­
parison of them. First, the RICO "pattern" must be undertaken within certain time limita­
tions to achieve the statute's goal of punishing continuous racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1961(5) (stating a time limitation of 10 years). Conversely, the CCE "continuing series" 
element does not contain any time limitations. Instead, that CCE element requires that the 
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The RICO statute, like the CCE, does not expressly address the prob­
lem of juror agreement with respect to the requisite predicate offenses. 
Consequently, a conflict has arisen among the circuits as to whether a 
RICO conviction will survive after some of the defendant's predicate 
act convictions, forming the basis for the RICO conviction, are va­
cated, but at least two of those convictions remain.266 At the heart of 
this conflict is the juror concurrence problem. If the jury were re­
quired to specifically agree upon which of the defendant's acts consti­
tuted a RICO pattern, this conflict would not present a problem. Such 
specific agreement, made clear through the use of special verdict 
forms,267 would specifically provide the grounds upon which the de­
fendant was convicted and, therefore, prevent any confusion as to 
which acts the jury found to constitute a RICO pattern. The majority 
of jurisdictions uphold the RICO conviction after one or more predi­
cate act convictions are vacated on appeal,268 while a minority would 
vacate the RICO conviction.269 
As a solution to this problem, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit in United States v. Coonan 270 suggested a pro­
cess of bifurcating jury deliberations into two segments.271 First, the 
defendant act "in concert with five or more" underlings in order to assure that the CCE 
violator holds a position of authority within a particular drug ring and is indeed a "king­
pin." 21 U.S.c. § 848(c)(2)(A); see supra note 20. Second, the CCE seeks to punish not 
only a certain type of activity, but also a certain type of individual. See supra notes 21-22 
and accompanying text. RICO, on the other hand, focuses solely on the defendant's activ­
ity. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text. Despite these differences, the two 
statutes are quite similar in structure. Both CCE and· RICO define complex statutory 
crimes. See supra note 26 a.nd accompanying text. In addition, both statutes give rise to 
similar juror unanimity problems because they each require that the defendant commit a 
number of predicate acts in order to be found guilty of the charged offense. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962(c); 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2). 
266. See United States v. McCulloch, No. 86 Cnm. 3453 (11th Cir. June 8,1987), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 947 (1987) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also 
Debra L. Weber, Comment, Reversal ofa RICO Predicate Offense on Appeal: Should the 
RICO Count Be Vacated?, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 183, 185 (1990). 
A RICO conviction must be vacated when all convictions for predicate racketeering 
acts that formed the basis of the RICO conviction are vacated. United States v. Walgren, 
885 F.2d 1417, 1424 (9th Cir. 1989). 
267. See infra notes 307-17 and accompanying text. 
268. United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 
965 (1983). For a thorough discussion of the majority view on this issue, see Weber, supra 
note 266, at 193-95. 
269. United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 
(1979). For a thorough discussion of the minority view on this issue, see Weber, supra note 
266, at 191-93. The Weber Comment also discusses RICO with respect to verdict consis­
tency. Id. at 186-9\. 
270. 839 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1486 (1992). 
271. Id. at 889-90. The court's solution did not address the unanimity problem, but 
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jury would consider the defendant's participation in the alleged predi­
cate "pattern of racketeering activity" offenses by responding to spe­
cial interrogatories addressing those offenses.272 Only after responding 
to those interrogatories, and finding that the defendant had committed 
the requisite predicate acts, would the jury be advised of the fact that a 
RICO conviction required two predicate acts.273 Second, the jury 
would be instructed on the requirements of a RICO violation in order 
to arrive at a general verdict on that count.274 By eliciting specific 
answers from the jury regarding the defendant's predicate offenses at 
the outset, the court would be certain as to precisely what acts the jury 
found the defendant had committed.275 The court in Coonan com­
mented that the second RICO instruction would not take away any of 
the jury's fact-finding duties276 because the charge "does not either 
refer to 'patterns' or require the jury to count the number of predicate 
acts proven against each defendant. "277 
Special verdicts are another option, similar in form to the jury 
interrogatories discussed in Coonan,278 that a court may use to clarify 
jury findings in complex cases.279 Special verdicts contain specific re­
did provide a useful mechanism for clarifying the acts on which the jury relied to convict 
the defendant. 
272. Id. at 889. 
273. Id. at 889 n.3. 
274. Id. at 889-90. 
275. Id. at 891. 
276. The Coonan dissent was concerned that the special findings suggested by the 
majority would take away the jury's traditional role of fact-finder and run counter to what 
it called a customary preference for general verdicts in criminal cases. Id. at 897 (Altimari, 
I., dissenting). The dissenting judge was concerned that the court "should not quickly 
dismiss any encroachment into the rarely-challenged domain of the jury." Id. at 896. He 
stated that this protection arises primarily from the defendant's right to a "fair trial," al­
lowing jurors to evaluate the law in light of the facts "without public scrutiny or legal 
intervention." Id. at 896-97. The dissent feared that procuring" 'yes' or 'no' answers to 
questions concerning the elements of an offense may propel a jury toward a logical conclu­
sion of guilt, whereas a more generalized assessment might have yielded an acquittal." Id. 
at 897 (quoting United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 927 (2d Cir.) (Newman, I., con­
curring in part and dissenting in part), em. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984». 
277. Coonan, 839 F.2d at 889 n.3. 
278. Id. at 889. As noted by Iudge Newman in Ruggiero, the term "special verdict" 
is often used to mean jury interrogatory. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d at 926 n.l (Newman, I., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49 
states that the courts may use special verdicts to procure detailed responses in place of a 
general verdict, while jury interrogatories procure detailed findings in concert with a gen­
eral verdict. FED. R. CIY. P. 49; see United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 205 n.l 
(2d Cir. 1987). 
279. See FED. R. CIY. P. 49(a) (1987). The relevant portion of that rule states, 
(a) Special Verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict 
in the form of a special written finding upon each 'issue of fact. In that event the 
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sponses by the jury to a set of questions that the court has submit­
ted.280 They serve the purpose of eliminating uncertainty in cases 
involving multiple theories of recovery to reveal "the whole case for 
what it is, both fact and law, for complete and final acceptance of the 
correct legal theory by the reviewing Court."281 
Although the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure sanction the use of 
special verdicts in civil cases,282 courts disfavor their use in the crimi­
nal arena.283 Courts view special verdicts in criminal cases as judicial 
interference with the jury's duty284 because eliciting such specific re­
sponses creates a threat of judicial overbearance on the jurors, who 
should be free "from judicial pressure, both contemporaneo1!s and 
subsequent."285 
Special verdicts are, however, permitted in some criminal 
cases.286 For instance, in criminal conspiracy cases, courts have rec­
ognized the suitability of special verdicts when the conspiracy has 
court may submit to the jury written questions ... or may submit written forms 
of the several special findings which might properly be made under the pleadings 
and evidence. . . . The court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruc­
tion concerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury 
to make its findings upon each issue. 
Id. 
280. Quaker City Gear Works, Inc. v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1136 (1985). 
281. Chief Judge John R. Brown, Federal Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator, 
44 F.R.D. 338, 345 (1968). 
282. See FED. R. CIv. P. 49(a) (allowing special verdicts in federal civil cases at the 
discretion of the court). 
283. See. e.g., United States v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1084 (2d Cir.) (ac­
knowledging that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had indicated 
that special verdicts were not generally favored in criminal cases, but upholding their use 
when the information sought was relevant to the sentence being imposed), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 845 (1984); United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 926 (2d Cir.) (Newman, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (recognizing that in some cases courts disfavor jury 
interrogatories in criminal cases), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United States v. Mur­
ray, 618 F.2d 892,895 n.3 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Stassi, 544 F.2d 579, 583-84 (2d 
Cir. 1976) (stating that special verdicts are improper in criminal cases except where rele­
vant to the sentence being imposed), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977); see also 9 CHARLES 
A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 512 (1971 & 
Supp. 1981) (asserting that the criminal jury's function does not stop at fact finding). 
284. United States v. Spack, 416 F.2d 165, 181 (1st Cir. 1969). 
285. Id. 
286. See United States v. Torres Lopez, 851 F.2d 520, 523 (1st Cir. 1988) (reproduc­
ing special verdict form and illustrating how it simplified the function of the reviewing 
court), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1021 (1989); Spack, 416 F.2d at 182 n.41 (1st Cir. 1969) 
(citing authorities under which special verdicts were permitted in criminal cases); see also 
United States v. Washington. 782 F.2d 807,822-24 (9th Cir. 1986) (providing for an alter­
native special verdict form). 
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more than one object,287 or when the special verdict questions seek 
information that is relevant to the defendant's sentence.288 In fact, in 
Schad v. Arizona,289 the Court recognized the Supreme Court of Ari­
zona's use of separate verdict forms in cases where alternative theories 
of the defendant's guilt were submitted to the jury.290 
In addition, Rule 31(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce­
dure sanctions the use of special verdicts in criminal forfeiture 
cases.29 1 United States v. Angiulo,292 for example, was a RICO case in 
which the jury, as part of its overall verdict, returned a special verdict 
form finding a variety of the defendant's assets to be subject to forfei­
ture.293 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized the legiti­
macy of special verdicts in capital punishment cases. 294 
In RICO cases where a juror concurrence issue arises under the 
"pattern" element,295 some courts have indicated that the jury must 
287. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d at 1083. In Orozco-Prada, the court concluded that the 
defendant's sentence was defective because the court could not determine the basis of his 
guilt. The indictment charged the defendant with a conspiracy that was punishable under 
two different sections of a federal statute, which each established different sentencing peri­
ods--one for cocaine-related conspiracies, which authorized a 15-year sentence and the 
other for marijuana-related conspiracies, which authorized a five-year sentence. Id. With­
out a special verdict, the court could not determine whether the object of the conspiracy 
was cocaine, marijuana, or both. Id. 
288. United States v. Owens III, 904 F.2d 411, 415 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
McNeese, 901 F.2d 585, 605 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Buishas, 791 F.2d 1310,1317 
(7th Cir. 1986); Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d at 1084. 
289. 111 S. Ct. 2491,2504 (1991); see supra notes 210-37 and accompanying text. 
290. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2504; see State v. Smith, 774 P.2d 811, 817 (Ariz. 1989). 
291. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e) states as follows: "If the indictment 
or the information alleges that an interest or property is subject to criminal forfeiture, a 
special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the interest or property subject to forfei­
ture, if any." FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e); see also United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 
1209 (lst Cir.) (recognizing use of special verdict forms under the forfeiture aspects of 
RICO), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 (1990). 
292. Angiu/o, 897 F.2d at 1209-16. 
293. [d. at 1209. 
294. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181-82 (1988). In Franklin, the Court 
stated that it has never permitted unlimited juror discretion. Id. at 181. The Court indi­
cated that the jury's discretion may be limited, the jury's consideration of mitigating evi­
dence may be directed, and in capital sentencing, states may channel jury discretion in an 
attempt to reach a fair implementation of the death penalty. Id. 
295. In some RICO cases, unanimity does not present a problem. When the defend­
ant is separately convicted of two predicate acts which combine to establish a RICO pat­
tern, for example, juror unanimity is not an issue because there is no question as to upon 
what acts the jury relied to find a RICO "pattern." See United States v. Weisman, 624 
F.2d 1118, 1124 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980). In Weisman, the district 
court's separate convictions on each of the predicate acts of the RICO charge assured the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that the jury had unanimously found the defend­
ant guilty of committing a "pattern" under RICO. Id. at 1124. It is when a number of 
predicate acts are alleged and not separately proven that the issue of juror unanimity arises 
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specifically agree upon which two racketeering acts a particular de­
fendant committed296 and some have indicated the value of special 
verdicts.297 For instance, in United States v. Ruggiero,298 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a RICO con­
viction because the reviewing court could not be sure from the jury's 
general verdict at trial whether the jury's findings of guilt were based 
on two or more legally adequate predicate acts.299 In remanding for a 
new trial on the RICO charge, the court recommended that the trial 
judge "request the jury to record their specific dispositions on the sep­
arate predicate acts· charged, in addition to their verdict of guilt or 
innocence on the RICO charge."3oo 
because there is uncertainty as to precisely which acts the jury relied on to find a pattern of 
racketeering activity. See supra text accompanying notes 195-200 for a discussion of when 
a factual concurrence problem arises under the CCE. 
296. United States v. Stodola, 953 F.2d 266, 272 n.4 (7thCir.) (upholding the suffi­
ciency of the district court's instruction, which charged, "You must be unanimous in your 
agreement as to what constitutes the two or more acts."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 
(1992); United States v. Madeoy, 912 F.2d 1486, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (recognizing the 
validity of the district court's special forfeiture verdict, which instructed the jury that they 
must "unanimously" agree upon the racketeering acts that a "particular defendant commit­
ted in reaching the verdict"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1008 (1991); United States v. 
Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1136 n.74 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating in dicta that the district court's 
jury interrogatories on the RICO count, submitted during jury deliberation, were proper), 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2010 (1991); United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 648 (3d Cir. 
1988) (upholding the district court's use of special verdict forms, which established specific 
juror unanimity). 
297. Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 648; United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 922-23 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984). 
298. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d at 913. In United States V. Coonan, the dissent cited Rug­
giero as one of the "limited" circumstances that would warrant limitation on the jury's 
power to render general verdicts. United States v. Coonan, 839 F.2d 886, 897 (2d Cir. 
1988); see a/so United States V. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 205-06 (2d Cir. 1987); Rug­
giero, 726 F.2d at 922-23, 925-28. 
299. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d at 921. In Ruggiero, the defendant was charged, in count 
one, with involvement in eight conspiracies which were the predicate offenses to indicate a 
RICO "pattern of racketeering" activity. Id. 
300. Id. at 923. In RICO cases where the trial court had utilized special verdicts, the 
appellate courts had a clear picture of upon which of the defendant's acts the jury had 
relied to convict. See United States V. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 851-52 (2d Cir.) (finding the 
evidence sufficient to uphold the trial court's conviction under RICO where the jury, by 
special verdict, found the defendant had committed nine predicate offenses prior to the five­
year statute of limitations for non-capital cases and six predicate offenses within the limita­
tions date, from which the appellate court concluded that the RICO pattern was satisfied), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983); United States V. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23,30 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(affirming the trial court's RICO conviction wherein the jury was asked to state, as to each 
specific transaction, whether it was proved beyond a reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 455 
U.S. 945 (1982). 
Where the trial court permitted only a general verdict on the RICO count, however, 
the appellate court confronted more of a problem. See United States V. Quicksey, 525 F.2d 
337, 340-41 (4th Cir. 1975) (upholding the trial court's conviction as long as the govern­
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In Echeverri,301 the defendant was accused of both a CCE and a 
RICO oifense.302 The appellate court noted that the district court 
gave a careful unanimity instruction on the RICO count with regard 
to the predicate acts required thereunder.303 Furthermore, the district 
court required the jury, on special verdict forms, to specify the predi­
cate RICO acts upon which they had unanimously agreed.304 The ver­
dict forms revealed unanimous agreement among the jurors that the 
defendant had participated in conspiracy to possess and distribute con­
trolled substances and had possessed cocaine with the intent to dis­
tribute, acts which constituted a RICO "pattern."30S The district 
court utilized the special verdict form to clarify which of the defend­
ant's acts the jury found to constitute a "pattern" under RICO.306 
Similarly, the use of special verdicts in CCE cases would elimi­
nate any uncertainty with regard to precisely which of the defendant's 
acts the jury's conviction was premised upon.307 United States v. Bec­
ton 308 was the first CCE case to suggest the use of special verdicts. 309 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated that 
it is "far preferable to list the felonies comprising the criminal enter­
prise in the CCE count of an indictment, thereby eliminating the po­
tential problems suggested by [the defendant]."310 Such a procedure 
ment agreed to re-sentencing, and stating that, "in the absence of a special verdict, it is not 
possible to ascertain whether the jury intended to find the defendants guilty of conspiracy 
to violate the Travel Act or the Drug Act, or both Acts"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 
(1976). 
301. United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988); see supra notes 89-117 
and accompanying text. 
302. Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 639. 
303. Id. at 643. 
304. Id. After the jury had reached a guilty verdict on the substantive RICO count, 
the court instructed the jury to return to the jury room to specify, on a special verdict form, 
which racketeering acts they had unanimously found the defendants to have committed. 
Id. at 648. Presumably, ifthe verdict form revealed less than unanimity on those predicate 
acts, the RICO conviction would not stand. 
305. Id. 
306. Id. As one commentator has noted, the use of special verdicts in RICO cases 
would solve the conflict of whether a RICO conviction could stand after some, but not all, 
of the defendant's predicate act convictions were vacated. Weber, supra note 266, at 203; 
see supra notes 266-69 and accompanying text. If a special verdict had been used in such a 
situation, the reviewing court could simply look to the jury's responses to determine upon 
which acts the jury had relied to convict the defendant under RICO. 
307. See also United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1989) (recognizing 
the possibility of the use of special interrogatories in CCE cases, but not allowing them in a 
case where the defendant failed to preserve his right to such interrogatories at trial), cert. 
denied, 490 U.S. 1109 (1991). 
308. 751 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985). 
309. Id. at 257. 
310. Id. The defendant, Becton, alleged on appeal that the indictment was imper­
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would assure that only drug "kingpins" were convicted under CCE 
and subject to the statute's harsh penalties.3Il Additionally, special 
verdicts in these cases would eliminate the potential for confusion as to 
whether a CCE conviction could stand if one or more of the defend­
ant's predicate offenses were vacated.312 
The complexity of statutes like RICO and the CCE gives rise to 
the issue of whether the jury must agree on the predicate acts that the 
defendant committed to constitute the substantive RICO or CCE of­
fense. Several RICO cases and one CCE case have encouraged the use 
of special verdicts in order to clarify jury findings on those predicate 
offenses.313 If a substantial majority of the jurors in a CCE case must 
agree on the underlying predicate offenses the defendant has commit­
ted to constitute a "continuing series" under the statute, the use of 
special verdicts would provide a clear picture of those predicate acts 
upon which the jury had relied to convict the defendant of a CCE 
offense. Although there are drawbacks in requiring such specific 
agreement,314 inCCE cases a heightened level of juror concurrence on 
the underlying statutory predicate acts should be required in order to 
avoid the possibility of a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's 
culpability.315 Through an augmented jury instruction, or through the 
use of special verdicts, the trial court could assure such juror agree­
ment. Requiring a certain degree of factual specificity is a small price 
to assure the "indispensable element"316 of juror agreement. Given 
the array of theories and predicate offenses asserted by the prosecution 
in cases involving complex statutory crimes like RICO and CCE, spe­
cial verdicts are a more appropriate procedural device than general 
verdicts to ensure the defendant's right to proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.317 
missibly vague and therefore violative of due process, and that the indictment should have 
listed the alleged felonies in order to protect him from double jeopardy. Id. at 256. 
311. See supra notes 23-25 for a discussion of the penalties for a CCE violation. 
312. See supra note 266 and accompanying text for a reference to this problem in 
RICO cases. 
313. See supra notes 296-308 and accompanying text. 
314. See supra note 276. Drawbacks include the possible usurpation of the jury's 
traditional role of fact-finder, a limit on the jury's power to render a general verdict of guilt, 
and influence from outside forces on the jury's decision-making process. 
315. See supra notes 191-200 and accompanying text. 
316. United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1020 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the 
district court's instructions were inadequate in a case involving false statements made to a 
federally insured bank, and the lower court should have augmented its instruction where 
one count was submitted to the jury on alternative theories). 
317. See supra notes 162-209 and accompanying text. 
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The "continuing series" element of the CCE318 was intended to 
limit the statute's coverage by targeting only those violators who fill 
the role of drug "kingpin." The Canino 319 court's analogy between 
the "continuing series" and "five or more underlings" elements of the 
statute320 failed to consider the dangers involved in permitting juror 
divergence on the predicate acts that comprise a CCE "continuing se­
ries." Failing to require substantial juror agreement presents a signifi­
cant potential for CCE conviction when a reasonable doubt still exists 
because a significant portion of the jury could not agree upon which 
predicate acts the defendant actually committed. While the danger of 
doubt, resulting from juror disagreement, might also exist with respect 
to the "five or more underlings" requirement, such doubt is of no con­
sequence if that part of the CCE is not an element. Specific juror 
agreement, implemented by a special verdict form for the "continuing 
series" element of the CCE, would secure significant juror agreement 
and protect the defendant's due process rightS.321 
CONCLUSION 
The drug problem in the United States has grown to catastrophic 
proportions and is no doubt a contributing factor to many other socie­
tal problems that exist today. One of the federal government's most 
powerful weapons in its arsenal against serious drug violators is the 
CCE. Courts have repeatedly upheld the CCE's harsh penalties as 
constitutional.322 The statute was meant to both penalize and rehabili­
tate major drug lords in an effort to attack the drug problem from the 
top of the drug ring chain of command. 323 
When it launched this major effort in the "war on drugs," Con­
gress never intended to infringe upon the criminal defendant's due 
318. As for the "five or more underlings" provision of the CCE statute, it may be 
peripheral to the statutory purpose. See United States v. Jackson, 879 F.2d 85, 88-89 (3d 
Cir. 1989); see supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text. Support for the Jackson ration­
ale lies in the fact that all but one of the circuits that have addressed the issue recognize 
that the identities of the five or more underlings need not be specified in the jury's verdict. 
See supra note 80 and accompanying text. This tends to indicate a general consensus 
throughout the circuits that the "five or more underlings" provision is indeed peripheral to 
the CCE's purpose. 
319. United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
1940 (1992). 
320. Id. at 946; see supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text. 
321. See supra notes 162-209 and accompanying text. 
322. See supra note 48. 
323. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
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process rights. It seems, however, that decisions like Canino 324 serve 
to slowly erode this right in CCE cases. Allowing the type of juror 
divergence that the Seventh Circuit permits, creates a significant po­
tential for a level of doubt in the jury's verdict that would prohibit 
conviction under our concept of due process. In order to remedy this 
problem, the courts should require a substantial majority of the jurors 
to specifically agree on the predicate acts that constitute the "continu­
ing series." To implement this requirement, courts should encourage 
the use of special verdicts in CCE cases where the juror non-con­
currence problem arises. 325 Such a requirement would benefit the gov­
ernment and criminal defendants alike, without being unduly 
burdensome. Special verdicts would eliminate the uncertainty that 
general verdicts promote in CCE cases. Such findings would also pre­
vent any potential problems regarding whether a CCE conviction 
could stand after some of the predicate act convictions were vacated. 
Consequently, the government would benefit due to a decreased risk of 
unjustified acquittals because a defendant would only be acquitted of 
the CCE charge if the vacated convictions represented the acts upon 
which the jury had relied to find a continuing series. Special verdicts 
on the "continuing series" element of CCE would not usurp any of the 
jury's functions because the court would still instruct the jury on the 
requirements for CCE conviction, leaving them to independently bal­
ance rules of law with fairness on each issue. 
As congressional legislation becomes more sophisticated, it is im­
perative that the criminal defendant's constitutional rights to due pro­
cess of law not fall by the wayside. The CCE statute's primary 
purpose is to punish the drug lords, not their subordinates. Allowing 
significant juror divergence on the predicate acts constituting the stat­
ute's "continuing series" element would disrupt that very purpose and 
intrude on the CCE defendant's constitutional right to due process of 
law. 
Katherine L. Harvey 
324. United States v. Canino. 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991). cert. denied. 112 S. Ct. 
1940 (1992). 
325. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text. 
